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Aggregation in Criminal Law
Brandon L. Garrett
This Article considers aggregation in criminal law. In criminal law,
fundamental constitutional rights to an individual day in court sharply
limit the occurrence of procedural aggregation, such as joinder, during
trials. By way of contrast, in civil cases, courts permit a range of
aggregate litigation, including consolidation and class actions.
Nevertheless, the boundaries between civil and criminal law approaches to
aggregation are more permeable than conventionally understood. Courts
now aggregate criminal cases, and they do so without violating
constitutional rights, by joining cases only before trial and during appeals.
I present five case studies examining novel aggregative procedures that
courts employed to remedy systemic criminal procedure violations such as
the lack of proportionality in death sentencing, wrongful convictions,
forensic fraud and inadequate indigent representation. Second, Iframe due
process safeguards to structure future aggregation in criminal law.
Finally, I develop a possible second wave of institutional reform that could
flow from intermediate models that do not aggregate but accomplish
similar goals, using innocence commissions, prosecutorial case review,
special masters, and two-tier models of judicial review. I conclude that
appropriate use of aggregation can potentially transform criminal
adjudication, by providing an avenue to vindicate criminal procedure
rights, and by encouraging efforts to create a more efficient, accurate, and
fair criminal justice system.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a prisoner whose conviction was based chiefly on blood
evidence from the crime scene asserts his actual innocence. He believes
that a state forensic technician fabricated blood evidence and lied to the
jury. Suppose that the state forensic laboratory did falsify the inculpatory
blood evidence not just in this prisoner's case, but in over a hundred other
criminal trials. Alone, each prisoner would face enormous difficulties in
obtaining counsel and experts to retest the evidence in his case. Even if a
prisoner obtained testing and a court exonerated him, he might never learn
of the larger pattern of misconduct. He certainly could not enjoin reform of
the laboratory responsible for his mistaken conviction.
Courts are beginning to address the practical obstacles to system-wide
relief in criminal cases by adopting novel forms of aggregation. By
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aggregation, I mean procedural aggregation-formal disposition of
common issues or claims in more than one case using techniques such as
joinder, consolidation, or a class action.' For example, the West Virginia
Supreme Court responded to the scenario just described by appointing a
special master, counsel, and experts for a group of 133 persons convicted
based on the state laboratory's possibly fabricated blood evidence.2 As a
result, a number of innocent prisoners were exonerated and released, and
the court ordered structural reform of laboratory practices to prevent future
miscarriages of justice. I Aggregation allowed the court to remedy a
"corruption of our legal system" that might otherwise have evaded review.4
Such aggregation in criminal law has gone unnoticed by scholars.
Courts have only infrequently aggregated criminal cases, in part because
aggregation seems to run against the grain of our constitutional criminal
procedure.5 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees a
fundamental right to an individual, not an aggregate, jury determination
regarding each element of a crime necessary to prove guilt. 6 For that
reason, courts rarely aggregate criminal trials, joining only factually-related
cases of co-conspirators or co-participants.7 After all, during joint trials,
criminal courts risk punishing the innocent through guilt by association,
conflicted counsel, and violating certain bedrock constitutional rights.!
The civil system exists in a different world where courts permit a
variety of aggregative mechanisms: not just joinder, but also consolidation
and the most complex and controversial development in modem
procedure-the class action.9 In permitting class actions, the Supreme
Court recognized that aggregation, despite creating an "inherent tension"
1. I use that definition throughout this Article. Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines
aggregation as "consisting of many persons united together" and referring to joinder of parties. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (6th ed. 1990); see infra Part I.C.
2. See In re an Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 502-03 (W. Va. 1993).
3. Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at I; see
also infra Part II.A.
4. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 508.
5. Scholars have never examined or discussed aggregation in criminal law, either in the sense of
joining cases together regarding criminal procedure rights, before trial, or on appeal. To help navigate
this unexplored terrain, I turn to civil categories of aggregation and accompanying due process rules.
See infra Part III.A. This Article also provides the first piece of a larger project mapping a field of
complex criminal litigation. For example, the following two articles examine systems of emergency
criminal procedure and structural reform remedies pursued by prosecutors. See Brandon L. Garrett &
Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L. J.
127 (2006); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 127 (forthcoming
2007).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1970); infra Part I.A.
7. As I discuss in infra Part I.A, in criminal cases joinder remains strictly limited.
8. See infra Part L.A for discussion regarding the role of Bill of Rights protections.
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000).
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with the "day-in-court ideal,"'" creates economies of scale enabling courts
to remedy rights with individually low value that would otherwise "be
without any effective redress.""
The strict line between criminal and civil cases regarding aggregation
is more flexible than it would first appear. Indeed, a number of courts have
begun to do what appeared beyond the pale in criminal law-to aggregate
criminal cases. They have even done so while adhering faithfully to the
Supreme Court's admonition that the guilt of each defendant must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts aggregated regarding limited
issues-criminal procedure rights distinct from individual questions of
guilt decided by the jury. Such criminal procedure rights, affirmatively
asserted by persons charged with crimes, may arise outside of the trial
phase, both before trial or after conviction during post-trial appeals. 2
In order to remedy systemic violations of criminal procedure rights,
courts have experimented with a variety of aggregative approaches. In each
of the five case studies I present, courts sought to identify, analyze, and
then correct systemic problems of the criminal system. In addition to the
West Virginia court that investigated and remedied forensic fraud, other
courts have aggregated post-trial death penalty cases to examine racial
disparity in sentencing, aggregated claims that the state provided
inadequate indigent defense representation, and consolidated federal
habeas corpus petitions. 3
In this Article, I use five case studies to explore the procedural and
remedial significance of aggregation as an emerging element, if not a new
paradigm, of our criminal justice system. I propose that the Supreme Court
embrace the grassroots innovations of courts that have aggregated cases to
provide remedies for systemic violations of criminal procedure rights.
Further, where criminal law lacks significant precedent for aggregation,
much less functional categories guiding its use, I develop a due process
model to structure future criminal law aggregation."
Such a due process model has special salience where aggregation in
criminal law risks replicating or magnifying existing disparities in the
criminal justice system. Suppose that the West Virginia Supreme Court
discussed above was overburdened. Rather than appoint a special master,
counsel, and experts for purposes of investigating the forensic fraud, the
court transferred a hundred petitions with similar allegations to a
magistrate. Suppose the magistrate then refused to appoint the prisoners a
lawyer or hold a hearing, but instead rendered a decision summarily
10. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); see also infra Part I.C.
1I. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
12. See infra Part 11.
13. See id.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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denying relief based solely on the State's bare representation that the lab
employed sound practices. In such a situation, the Supreme Court's
insistence that the criminal justice system resist the pull of administrative
efficiency seems warranted.15 Each of the procedural issues raised by this
hypothetical-namely, non-party preclusion, the potential for inadequate
representation, and the lack of exit rights-is addressed by my due process
framework, which is designed to curb the possible abuses aggregation in of
our "overworked criminal justice system."'16
Our criminal justice system does not lack the means to achieve
economies of scale. Legislatures, courts and attorneys channel and sift
criminal cases at all stages using prosecutorial discretion, plea agreements,
docket management, substantive criminal law, mandatory sentencing
schemes, post-conviction rules, and specialized courts.17 Given the ready
availability of those powerful organizing tools to systematize disposition of
cases, courts need not use aggregation just to achieve judicial economy or
uniform results. The five case studies suggest that aggregation instead
serves a broader constitutional and remedial purpose. Courts adopted
aggregation in criminal law because it provided the means to ameliorate
systemic violations of defendants' criminal procedure rights that would
otherwise "be without any effective redress."' 8 Aggregation empowers not
just courts but also victims of constitutional violations by creating
opportunities to enjoin systemic criminal procedure violations and craft
structural reforms for institutions; pool information about the existence and
causes of recurring violations; secure legal representation and expert
assistance; and achieve greater equality than in the adjudication of
individual cases.
Finally, I suggest that aggregation by courts could assist a second
wave of grassroots innovation by encouraging other institutions to adopt
15. The untold story of the demise of the habeas corpus class action, discussed infra Part I.D.,
also demonstrates the importance of due process protections. No scholars have discussed habeas class
actions other than a student in a note from 1968, written the year after the first habeas class action was
brought. See Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1968). For two
decades federal courts certified habeas class actions brought by petitioners alleging their convictions
were unconstitutional. Those class actions have vanished, and for good reasons, due to harsh preclusive
effects under the new federal habeas statute, which prevents all class members from bringing
subsequent habeas petitions with their individual claims. See infra Part I.D.2.
16. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 338 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part I.B. In civil law, the American Law Institute draft "Principles of the Law of
Aggregation" terms such proceedings that coordinate separate lawsuits for efficiency as
"Administrative Aggregations," distinct from "Joinder Actions" that join multiple parties and
"Representative Actions" in which a party represents a class. See American Law Institute, Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation (April 21, 2006) (draft on file with author). I instead use the terms
institutional systematization and institutional reform to describe various "administrative aggregation"
phenomena in criminal law. See infra Part 1.13, Il. The ALl draft does not consider aggregation in
criminal law, but instead limits its principles to civil suits only, excluding bankruptcy. See id. at 3.
18. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
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reforms to prevent recurring criminal justice errors. Institutional reform
could include innocence commissions, models of prosecutorial review,
special masters, and a system of two-tiered review. In the post-DNA era,
mounting scientific evidence that innocent persons are wrongly convicted
suggests reasons for institutions to develop such responses.' 9 Nevertheless,
where self-regulation fails, court should aggregate cases to provide
systemic remedies and deter future violations.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines why courts rarely
use aggregation in criminal law, beginning with the Supreme Court's
resistance to aggregation in its focus on the individual criminal defendant's
right to a "day in court," viewed against many features of the criminal
system that already promote uniformity. Part I then contrasts the Court's
tolerance of aggregation in the civil arena-including because it facilitates
remedies for violations of constitutional rights-with how the Court
hastened the demise of the habeas corpus class action designed to
accomplish that very purpose regarding criminal procedure rights. The
Court's apparently strict boundaries between civil and criminal procedure
remain somewhat permeable. Part II presents evidence of a new conception
of aggregate criminal adjudication: five case studies of aggregation in
criminal law, conducted by four state supreme courts and a federal circuit
court regarding criminal procedure rights in order to remedy systemic
problems. Part III argues that the Supreme Court should embrace a
functional due process framework focusing on preclusion, adequate
representation, and exit rights, to structure aggregation in criminal law.
Part III concludes by examining alternative institutional reform models
such as innocence commission review of wrongful convictions, use of
special masters to review federal habeas corpus petitions, prosecutorial
case review, and two-tiered appellate review, that each may supplement
aggregation to remedy systemic violations of criminal procedure rights.
I
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL APPROACHES TO AGGREGATION
A. Aggregation in Civil Law
I have defined aggregation as procedural aggregation, that is, judicial
joinder of common issues or claims in more than one case, using
techniques such as simple joinder, consolidation, or class actions. To
understand why the criminal system does not appear to adopt such
procedural aggregation, and what kinds of aggregation could emerge in
criminal law, it is useful to first review the types and purposes of
aggregation in civil law, where modern aggregation originated. While
19. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law,
2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 42-46, 51-53 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law].
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criminal courts use joinder only in limited circumstances, civil courts use a
range of techniques to aggregate. In fact, the Court's functional
approach to aggregation in civil cases "calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."2 These categories of
aggregation include: joinder, consolidation, and several types of class
actions."
Civil joinder, as in criminal law, is limited to factually-related cases
under a transaction test, to avoid prejudice to those bound.22 However, in
civil cases, joinder may sometimes be compelled, and outside parties may
intervene as well.23
Consolidation permits courts to more broadly join civil cases for a
"joint hearing or trial" when they involve "common questions of law or
fact." 24 This includes consolidation of federal multi-district litigation
through venue transfer,25 often in mass tort cases.26
Class actions provide the most important model for aggregation in
criminal law. The class action mechanism, governed by Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits a representative of a class to join
and bind claims of persons not before the court as formal parties.27
Recognizing an "inherent tension" between "collectivism" and the "deep-
20. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (holding that due process requires "notice reasonably certain to
reach most of the interested" parties given a class with a "large number of small interests").
21. Courts also use methods of aggregation in bankruptcy proceedings and interpleader. See 11
U.S.C. § 362 (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties asserting relief "arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences").
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (compulsory joinder of necessary and indispensable parties); FED. R. Civ.
P. 13(h) (permits joinder of parties relevant to cross claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)-(b) (permits
impleader of derivatively liable third parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (permits multiple types of
intervention).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see also Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933)
("[Clonsolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration."); Howard
M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among
Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 414 n. 138 (2000).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000); see also Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S.
19, 26 (1960) ("To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are
simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money
that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent."). In civil cases federal courts can consolidate pre-trial
"multidistrict litigation" "pending in different districts," when civil actions "involve[] one or more
common questions of fact" and to "promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions"; such actions
are remanded to originating districts for trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
26. Examples of consolidation include: In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 1993 WL 463301, at
*1 (J.P.M.L.) (39,000 asbestos actions); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F.
Supp. 1098, 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (78 breast implant cases); In re A.H. Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540, 541 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (54 Dalkon Shield cases).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all .... ").
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rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,"28
the drafters of the federal rules created each category of class action to
secure due process protections for class members appropriate to the nature
of the claims and the relief sought. The Rule creates two broad types of
class actions: voluntary and mandatory. Voluntary Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions can be formed when the claims of class members have common
"questions of law or fact" and "a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."29 In
order to protect class members' due process rights, Rule 23 requires that
class members be afforded notice and an opportunity to opt-out.30 Further,
such class actions can be maintained on specific "issues," that is, not entire
legal claims, but distinct legal or factual questions common to the class.3 '
Rule 23(b) also provides for several types of mandatory class actions in
which plaintiffs need not provide potential class members with individual
notice and an opportunity to opt-out,32 since the remedy sought would as a
practical matter bind all parties regardless.
Aggregation, in all of its varied forms, serves several functions. The
"policy at the very core" of aggregation is that of efficiency.33 In situations
where low-value cases would not be "economically feasible" if brought
alone, the Court notes that "aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device." 3
Through aggregation, both plaintiffs and defendants avoid costs of
piecemeal litigation, and courts benefit from the resulting economies of
scale.35 Aggregation not only permits efficient adjudication, but it can also
improve the quality of adjudication, including its accuracy and fairness.
More resources can be pooled in an aggregate case, both in representation
and in expert and judicial resources. Class members can pool information
regarding the causes of their alleged injuries, permitting aggregate
28. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
762 (1989) (quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4449 417 (1981))).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
32. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 834 & n.13. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due
Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002).
33. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997) ("The policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor.").
34. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
35. See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 subdivision (b)(3) ("The
burden that separate suits would impose on the party opposing the class, or upon the court calendars,
may also fairly be considered.").
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discovery, proof and more accurate outcomes. 36 In addition, greater
equality may be achieved where cases are uniformly disposed en masse. 7
A central goal of aggregation is to facilitate the vindication of
constitutional and civil rights. At the core of that mission is Rule 23(b)(2),
created to promote class actions which, instead of seeking primarily
economic or individual relief, seek injunctive or declaratory relief. The rule
drafters envisioned the paradigmatic 23(b)(2) case as a civil rights class
action, such as one that seeks to enjoin unconstitutional race
discrimination. 38 All of the benefits of aggregation discussed, including
access to representation, expert assistance, information, and
judicial resources, empower plaintiffs seeking injunctive remedies
for constitutional violations.39 Civil rights cases seeking to demonstrate
systemic violations and the need for structural reform particularly benefit
from collective information gathering and the deterrent effect of collective
participation and judgment (and the award of class-wide attorneys' fees).4"
Despite its many benefits, aggregation raises unique due process
dangers in criminal law that will be explored in Part III. Most of the
controversies in class action practice, however, relate not to efforts to
enjoin systemic violations of constitutional rights under Rule 23(b)(2), but
rather to class actions that chiefly involve economic recoveries. Cases
primarily seeking money damages raise perennial problems of adequacy of
representation, where attorneys may be opportunistically motivated more
by their own recovery rather than by the interests of all class members.4
36. See id.
37. See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 ("Actions by or against
a class provide a ready and fair means of achieving unitary adjudication."); In re Ephedra Prods. Liab.
Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2004) ("Centralization under Section 1407 is thus
necessary in order to avoid duplication of discovery, prevent inconsistent or repetitive pretrial rulings,
and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.").
38. See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, subdivision (b)(2)
("Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating
unlawfully against a class"); 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
4.11, at 4-37 (stating that the provisions of Rule 23(b) were "designed specifically for civil rights cases
seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief'); see also George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47
U. CHI. L. REV. 688 (1980).
39. But see David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1226-28, 1235 (2005) (noting recent Supreme Court rulings that
make obtaining aggregate relief in civil rights cases more difficult).
40. See, e.g., Lesley Frieder Wolf, Note, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification
After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1848 & n.4 (2000).
41. See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 927
(1998); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 195
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1348-62 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney:The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs 'Attorney 's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469 (1994).
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For these reasons, the Court has held that due process permits preclusion of
non-parties in class actions only on the condition that they are "adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party. 42 Thus
Rule 23 also requires that courts carefully inquire into the adequacy of
counsel.4 3 Further, the Court has exhibited concern with the adequacy of
representation in class action settlements by requiring courts to rigorously
police their fairness." Thus, civil aggregation, though flexible, retains
important due process boundaries.
In summary, the civil system permits several functional categories of
aggregation and provides a vehicle to vindicate constitutional rights. In
contrast, the remedial purpose of aggregation has been neglected in our
criminal system, due both to strict limits aimed at preserving the individual
criminal defendant's right to a day in court and to institutional
systematization in the criminal law system.
B. The Individualized Criminal System
Aggregation remains a largely unused method of criminal
adjudication in the United States. Where core individual rights are at stake
in criminal trials, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that every
criminal defendant deserves an individual "day in court." The Court has
accordingly developed a rigid set of rights that appear to preclude any
significant aggregation of criminal cases.45 Most dramatically, the Court
invoked these principles in recent decisions regarding sentencing
guidelines.46 A look at the institutions that dominate the criminal system
further explains the lack of aggregation in criminal law. Repeat players,
such as criminal courts, prosecutors and public defenders, can achieve
economies of scale without aggregation, by coordinating, channeling and
settling cases, all in the shadow of strict sentencing rules that routinize
outcomes. Yet the criminal system lacks mechanisms to remedy systemic
violations of criminal defendants' core constitutional rights. Those
constitutional criminal procedure rights include: the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the right to have exculpatory evidence disclosed, and
the right to be free from suggestive eyewitness identifications, coerced
custodial interrogations and the fabrication of evidence.
42. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42
(1940) and FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(B); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
44. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20, 627 (1997) (class action settlement must provide "structural assurance of fair
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected"); see also Samuel
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 337, 349-66,
371 (2000) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Governance].
45. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948)).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
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1. Criminal Trials
Unlike the civil system, the criminal system overwhelmingly
prosecutes single defendants with only the sporadic and procedurally-
restricted group trial involving conspiracies or co-participants. One
explanation for the dearth of procedural aggregation in criminal law is that
the Supreme Court has ruled that because reputation, liberty, or even life
may be at stake during criminal trials, those proceedings must be highly
individualized. The Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment require,
as a "bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle," a jury trial and proof to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to prove each
element constituting a crime.47 The Sixth Amendment also gives structure
to the day in court, enumerating additional rights to a speedy, public trial,
notice of the charges, confrontation of witnesses, and an impartial jury.4" In
criminal cases, those rigid constitutional constraints bar all methods of
aggregation but simple joinder.
Even simple joinder in criminal cases is strictly limited by a
transaction test: criminal defendants may be jointly tried only when they
participated in the same acts or transactions.49 In cases involving shared
conduct, courts may still order separate trials due to Confrontation and Due
Process Clause protections against the dangers of guilt by association.5"
Further, group representation by the same attorney rarely occurs in
criminal cases, unlike in civil cases where common counsel can represent
an entire class.5 The Supreme Court protects the right to effective counsel
as a "fundamental right of criminal defendants."52 The Court presumes
prejudice and violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) ("[T]he jury
verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (internal citation omitted) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged."); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)
(reversing joint representation of codefendants with conflicting interests absent showing of prejudice).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. See FED. R. CuM. P. 8(b) ("The indictment or information may charge two or more
defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction ...."). Defendants
must show prejudice to obtain a severance, and the decision whether to grant a severance is within the
discretion of the trial judge. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14; Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537-40
(1993).
50. On the danger of guilt by association, see United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362, 371 (D.
Colo. 1996) (ordering separate trials due to "unacceptable risk" of a Confrontation Clause violation
should Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (who were both accused of plotting the Oklahoma City
bombing) be tried jointly); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968) (holding that introduction
of co-defendant's confession inculpating defendant violated the Confrontation Clause); Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959) ("[G]uilt by association remains a thoroughly discredited doctrine.").
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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when courts require joint representation at trial. 3 When defendants waive
conflicts and agree to joint representation, courts still must inform them of
the risks of joint representation and ensure that no prejudice arises.54 In
group trials, defendants each retain a right to individual sentencing." Thus,
criminal trials remain largely individualized. Even in situations involving
group crime, the law entitles defendants to individualized jury
determinations regarding each element of the crime, as well as
individualized representation and sentencing.
2. Institutional Systematization
Despite occasional joint trials, the American criminal law ideal
remains one of a binary prosecution of a single criminal defendant, by a
public prosecutor, with a jury empanelled to decide, beyond a reasonable
doubt, each element relevant to an individual's guilt or innocence. A
second explanation for the apparent lack of aggregation in criminal
adjudication is the relative lack of pressure to resolve common cases
through aggregate procedures. This explanation focuses on the institutional
reality of our criminal system. The individual criminal procedure ideal
conforms to black letter constitutional law; the Supreme Court calls the
criminal trial the "main event,"56 and focuses its constitutional rulings on
that event. However, those rulings disguise how exceedingly rare criminal
trials remain. Criminal trials have been more accurately described as
"island[s] of technicality in a sea of discretion." 7
Unlike in the civil system, whether and how a criminal case is
investigated and tried, depends to a great degree on the preferences and
53. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485, 488 (1978) (holding that "an attorney's
request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court
regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted" and that "whenever a trial court improperly requires
joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic"); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70 (1942) (holding that requiring an attorney to represent two codefendants in conspiracy case whose
interests were in conflict denied Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel).
54. A defendant may formally waive the right to assistance of an attorney unhindered by a
conflict of interest, Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70, but federal courts are required under FED. R. CRiM. P. 44(c)
to hold a hearing to "personally advise" defendants to ensure that they understand their right to separate
representation and the risks of joint representation. Even given a valid waiver, the district court has a
responsibility to "take appropriate measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel" unless there is
"good cause to believe that no conflict of interest is likely to arise." Id.
55. The Sentencing Guidelines require individualized sentencing based on degree of
participation. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAl § 3B1.2 (1998) (reduction for a minor
participant); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(c) (1998) (enhancement fora manager
or supervisor); see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771 (2003).
Individualized sentences are required despite the fact that "most courts require only 'slight evidence'
connecting the defendants to the conspiracy for a conviction," unless a person withdraws from a
conspiracy. Beth Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
777 (2001).
56. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
57. Livingston Hall & Sheldon Glueck, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 3 (1st
ed. 1951).
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discretion of powerful institutional actors. Far more so than in civil law,
repeat players dominate the criminal system. In turn, those players-law
enforcement, legislatures, judges, defense lawyers and prosecutors-help
define the rules of the system. 58 Methods of coordinating, channeling,
settling, and disposing of criminal cases, from plea bargaining,
prosecutorial discretion, specialized courts, to strict sentencing rules, each
categorize cases, although they do not call on courts to engage in
aggregation or render group decisions.59
I call such processes in which repeat players in the criminal system
seek to regiment disposition of cases and take advantage of certain
economies of scale, but without procedural aggregation, "institutional
systemization." The systematizing roles of the dominant criminal law
actors-law enforcement officers, legislatures, judges, defense lawyers and
prosecutors-remain distinct in their impact on criminal law outcomes.60
First, local law enforcement personnel exercise broad investigatory
discretion which often determines whether a case is later prosecuted.6
Second, legislatures define substantive criminal law, with a recent
"severity revolution" vastly enhancing sentences and the scope of
criminalization in state and federal courts.62 During this "twenty-five-
58. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
59. On analogous informal arrangements among plaintiffs' attorneys in civil cases, termed
"informal aggregation," see Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account ofAmerican Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (describing
history of informal, bureaucratized aggregate settlement structures in American tort law); Erichson,
supra note 24, at 386-409 (describing informal coordination by counsel in "non-class" civil litigation).
60. See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 357, 366-68 (1986); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 27-30 (1993). On the history of the rise of plea bargaining, see George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 893-94 (2000). On passage of federal habeas corpus after
the Civil War, see RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 2.1-2.6 (2001); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
1031-32 (1985). On how mounting tort dockets from personal injury cases in a rapidly industrializing
society produced sustained pressure on courts to speed disposition of criminal cases, see Fisher, supra
at 996-1001, 1074; see also supra notes 37-38.
61. In response, the Warren Court's due process "revolution" created a series of individual
procedural rights that define the modem criminal law day-in-court ideal discussed in the last section.
See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(1966); see also David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1728-31,
1736-41 (2005). The Court also enhanced collateral review of constitutional error at trial in federal
courts. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas
After the Revolution, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 65, 66, 77-80 (1994).
62. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902, 929-32 (1991); William J.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,
25-27 (1997). [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]
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year national experiment with mass incarceration,"6 3 the Supreme Court
returned discretion and power to local law enforcement actors, requiring
lower courts to defer to state findings and engage in more cursory, limited
procedural disposition of cases intended to promote judicial economy,
finality, and federalism.' Congress then codified many of those restrictive
rules in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).65
Third, judges play a central systematizing role in directing specialized
criminal courts, as they supervise the intersection of each of the other
institutional actors in their courtrooms. Judges manage the defense lawyers
and prosecutors appearing before them, control criminal dockets, rule on
the scope and nature of criminal law, influence which cases are tried or
settled, and influence legislation. 66 Appellate courts in particular benefit
from deferential procedural rules that limit the relief that petitioner's can
obtain in criminal cases, as well as limiting availability of legal
representation during criminal appeals.67 Appellate decisions affect groups
of cases without procedural aggregation, by setting legal precedent and
applying it to subsequent cases using stare decisis. While the Supreme
Court, for example, did not join all death penalty cases in Furman v.
Georgia, the Court's holding overturned every death sentence in the
country.68
63. Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Murder, Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The Political Landscape
of American Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495, 497 (2005); see also THOMAS P. BONCZAR,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, 1, 2
tbl. 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piusp0 l.pdf; INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
64. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991); Barry Friedman, Failed
Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 485 (1995); Ann Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
65. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in various sections of title twenty-
eight of the United States Code). The AEDPA, among other changes, severely limited the standard of
review of habeas petitions, barred hearings on facts not presented in state court absent a convincing
showing of innocence, and banned "successive" petitions on any claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)-(b),
2253(c)(2) (2000).
66. On the role of elected state criminal judges in controlling appointment of defense counsel,
influencing legislation affecting the criminal system, and deferentially reviewing decisions by trial
judges, see Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas
Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1805 (2000).
67. See infra notes 85, 124.
68. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court's recent sentencing guidelines decisions
similarly have had system-wide effects on dispositions. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 508 (2000); see infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, almost all criminal defendants are indigent and represented by
institutional and repeat player public defenders, who often have severe
resource constraints and thus are incentivized to plea bargain their cases.69
Finally, our present system dramatically systematizes cases before
prosecutors, the ultimate repeat players, since they litigate all criminal
cases. Indeed, prosecutors resolve almost all criminal cases without trial
using plea bargaining based on internal rules and procedures.7" Reinforcing
their power, statutes and sentencing guidelines arm prosecutors with wide
discretion. The resulting domination of plea bargaining has been described
as more akin to "what common lawyers would describe as a non-
adversarial, administrative system of justice."'" The reasons include that
"the traditional adversarial model has become too expensive, contentious,
and inefficient to be restored."72 Though litigants remain formally entitled
to an individual day in court, courts try few cases, and informally,
prosecutors provide a de facto forum for bargaining in which they define
the flexible administrative standards that largely determine outcomes.73
Despite the trend of ever-increasing institutional systematization in
criminal law, the Supreme Court set strict limits when it intruded on
forbidden territory-the elements of a crime that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial. The national movement toward using complex
rules to achieve uniformity and efficient dispositions and, in doing so,
enhancing institutional discretion of prosecutors, reached an apex with
Congress's passage of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in 1984. 74 Congress
and state legislatures enacted sentencing guidelines to impose consistent
standards on criminal cases by requiring judges to follow rigid rules at the
sentencing stage: the 258-box grid of the U.S. Sentencing Table scores on
one axis of the grid the defendant's prior record and on the other axis
the seriousness of the crime.75 Judge Pierre N. Leval noted the cost to
69. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE STATISTICS,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/id.htm (finding that in the 100 most populous counties,
spending on indigent defense "represents an estimated 3% of all local criminal justice expenditures
used for police, judicial services, and corrections in these counties"); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship,
supra note 62, at 7, 10-11 (citing data that state and local spending for prosecutors tripled from 1971 to
1990 and spending on police rose 60%, while spending on indigent defense per case "declined
significantly").
70. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324-25 (1999) ("Over 90% of federal criminal
defendants whose eases are not dismissed enter pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.") (citations
omitted); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 956 (3d ed. 2000) ("In the United States,
the great majority of criminal cases are disposed of by plea of guilty rather than by trial.").
71. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2118, 2142 (1998).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2118; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 715
(2005) (exploring the role of administrative agencies in criminal sentencing).
74. See Alschuler, supra note 62.
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 (1998).
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individualized review: "Offender characteristics have been virtually
excluded from the guideline grid calculation.... , In response, the
Supreme Court emphasized the individual day in court ideal in its line of
decisions including United States v. Booker,17 Blakely v. Washington,78 and
Apprendi v. New Jersey.7 In each decision the Court ruled that a
sentencing guidelines scheme had unconstitutionally assigned factfinding
authority to a judge, not the jury, invoking the strict rule that elements of a
crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Although such
sentencing guidelines do not join cases together through procedural
aggregation, but instead merely create generally applicable rules, the Court
used anti-aggregation rhetoric in Blakely, rejected "the civil-law
ideal of administrative perfection,"'" noted how judges are "increasingly
bureaucratic," and disparaged the "bureaucratic realm of perfect equity,"
because though the jury trial "has never been efficient . . . it has always
been free."82 Though the Court aimed to preserve an individualized day in
court, dissenters pointed out that the Court failed to recognize the
overwhelming disposition of cases by plea-bargaining.83
Though the Supreme Court still invokes an individual day in court
ideal, the developments outlined indicate a rising tide of rules and
institutional arrangements that, without calling for courts to aggregate
using joinder of cases, nevertheless define the day in court that defendants
are entitled to receive, but which in practice they overwhelmingly do not
receive.
76. United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Judge Leval
presciently noted that the Guidelines might only be constitutional if judges have the power to depart
from them. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) ("[E]veryone agrees that the
constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had
omitted from the SRA the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges.").
77. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
78. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
79. 530 U.S. 508 (2000).
80. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 230 ("It has been settled throughout our history that the Constitution
protects every criminal defendant 'against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."') In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).
81. 542 U.S. at 313 (2004). Similarly, in Booker, the Court explained that the right to a jury trial
"enshrined in the Sixth Amendment - has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly"
and quoted Blackstone that "doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient."
Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; see also Alschuler, supra note 62, at 918-24.
82. 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 316, 321 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court in Blakely recognized
only in passing the reality of plea bargaining, stating: "the Sixth Amendment ... guarantees the right to
jury trial. It does not guarantee that a particular number of jury trials will actually take place." Id. at
312.
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C. A Case for Aggregation in Criminal Law
In our current criminal system, repeat players generate the means to
achieve vast economies of scale resulting in fewer criminal trials and
therefore fewer opportunities to vindicate criminal procedural rights at
trial. While efficient for repeat player actors, the system does not
accomplish one of the central purposes of aggregation: to provide a vehicle
for the vindication of constitutional rights. In our criminal system,
individual defendants and prisoners face great difficulty obtaining any
remedy for errors, and far more substantial obstacles hinder legal efforts to
enjoin persistent patterns of constitutional criminal procedure violations.
The reasons have little to do, however, with any individual right to a day in
court.
One reason few individuals secure judicial relief for constitutional
violations remains that given the dominance of prosecutorial-driven plea
bargains, almost all cases result in guilty pleas; the Court has held that "a
defendant who pleads guilty forgoes a fair trial as well as various
other accompanying constitutional guarantees."' In the few cases that do
proceed to trial, strict post-conviction rules create a "maze of procedural
barriers" to relief-including limiting rules in the AEDPA, procedural
default, harmless error, exhaustion, and non-retroactivity doctrine-that
substantially close off appellate remedies for constitutional criminal
procedure violations at trial." For that reason, the core criminal procedure
claims directed at police and prosecutorial misconduct-such as Brady
claims, suggestive eyewitness identification claims, coerced confession
claims, and fabrication of evidence claims-rarely succeed.86
Further, individual appeals lack a recognized avenue to raise patterns
of systemic error. One model for criminal law aggregation vindicating
systemic violations of constitutional rights could be the same as in the civil
context: civil class actions. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights
litigation ancillary to criminal litigation commonly sought to remedy
patterns and practices of police abuse or prosecutorial misconduct. Such
civil actions regarding criminal cases, however, now face substantial
doctrinal roadblocks and rarely result in relief.17 Civil actions regarding
84. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002).
85. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at 112-19 (summarizing limitations in the AEDPA);
Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "'Process, " 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313,
318-19 (1999); Rudovsky, supra note 39, at 1249-54 (summarizing federal habeas corpus and harmless
error limits).
86. Available evidence indicates the vast majority of post-conviction claims are dismissed for
procedural reasons unrelated to the merits. See VICTOR E. FLANGO, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, HABEAS
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 45-59 (1994), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
WC/Publications/KISStaFedHabCorpStFedCts.pdf#search=%22habeas%20tudy%22; see also Garrett,
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 69-77.
87. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 1
(2001) (describing a litany of obstacles faced by class actions seeking relief against discriminatory law
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police investigations, such as search and seizure claims, may occasionally
be brought as class actions88 yet, the Court has sharply limited injunctive
relief against law enforcement, based on doctrines of federalism, comity
and deference.89
In contrast, not even the narrow avenue of civil rights class actions
remains available to attack systemic violations of criminal procedure rights
of persons charged with crimes, during their prosecutions, criminal trials,
or criminal appeals. Such criminal procedure rights cannot be effectively
remedied in civil rights actions for several reasons. The Supreme Court
adopted doctrines particularly deferential to criminal justice actors, barring
outright any suits seeking to enjoin pending criminal prosecutions, 90
barring outright civil suits challenging a conviction until an acquittal or
vacatur of the criminal conviction, 91 and finding prosecutors absolutely
immune from civil damages.92 The combined effect of those rulings nearly
entirely closes off civil remedies for violations of criminal procedure fair
trial rights.93
The existence of at least some persistent, recurring problems in our
criminal system is fairly uncontroversial, and my purposes are modest-I
mean to only indicate that there are some recurring errors that could benefit
from some mechanism to pursue the aggregate remedies. Data available
from a comprehensive study of death penalty verdicts shows that both
egregiously incompetent defense counsel and prosecutorial suppression of
evidence are frequent and persistent causes of capital reversals. 94 In
enforcement) [hereinafter Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling]; Rudovsky, supra note 39, at 1210-11,
1226-28, 1236. I have described elsewhere possible transformative effects of individual civil wrongful
conviction suits seeking damages (and sometimes resulting in injunctive settlements). See Garrett,
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 99-107.
88. See Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 87.
89. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (ruling that standing doctrine
limits availability of injunctive relief, particularly as against law enforement, and urging federal
"restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the
State's criminal laws"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (limiting availability of injunctive
relief against local law enforcement); see also Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While
Black. Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000) [hereinafter
Garrett, Standing While Black].
90. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts must abstain from
enjoining pending state prosecutions except in highly extraordinary circumstances).
91. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
92. Prosecutors remain absolutely immune for their work as officers of the court. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
93. See, e.g., Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 53-54 (describing the
effect of the Heck rule and exploring how in a narrow band of DNA exoneration cases, civil suits may
have a more powerful deterrent effect); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 780 (2006) (The Supreme Court in Lyons "effectively barred injunctions as
a remedy for police misconduct."). But see Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 87, at 61,
76-81.
94. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES 1973-
1995, 5 (2000) (finding, in landmark study of rulings during capital appeals, that ineffective counsel
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contrast, it is more difficult to draw conclusions from data regarding non-
capital cases suggesting few reversals. 95 Nevertheless, given the degree to
which repeat players represent both sides in the criminal system, one might
naturally expect a range of errors in criminal cases to recur and not to exist
in isolation. For example, though ineffective assistance claims are typically
raised only in individual cases, indigent defense is provided by local
government, and thus gross deficiencies would be likely across entire
localities and states if the statutory funding scheme was deficient.
Indeed, data from national studies documenting and analyzing ineffective
and under-funded indigent defense counsel shows precisely such systemic
ineffectiveness. 96 Another data point that has had heightened salience
is the surge in exonerations produced by DNA evidence: 196 exonerations
to date. 9' The DNA revolution has provided rich information
about convictions revealed as erroneous, 98 used by courts, lawmakers,
prosecutors, police departments, and social scientists to explore
remedies to prevent miscarriages, 99 including in the areas of unreliable or
suggestive eyewitness identifications,""0 police or prosecutorial suppression
accounted for 37% of reversals and suppression of evidence accounted for sixteen to 19% of
reversals).
95. See FLANGO, supra note 86, at 62 (noting that less than 1% of federal habeas corpus petitions
were granted during study period). Several possibilities exist. Perhaps few errors occur, perhaps
prisoners fail to raise errors when they do, or perhaps prisoners fail to raise errors properly, resulting in
the observed large percentages of cases where courts do not reach the merits due to procedural errors.
96. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7-8 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter
ABA REPORT]; THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf (study documenting grossly inadequate indigent defense resources
based on data collection in eleven states); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY
EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL 2002 (2003) (comprehensive state by state
survey of indigent defense funding); see also infra notes 246-250.
97. See, e.g., Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 51-53. I have in draft
form a comprehensive study of the criminal appeals brought by DNA exonerees, the causes of those
convictions, and the rulings by appellate courts on their claims. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence (on file with author).
98. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations In The United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005); Innocence Project, Understanding the Causes,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Innocence
Project Study].
99. See, e.g., Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006) (conducting study of blind sequential lineup procedures in Hennepin
County, Minnesota, and finding substantial reduction in potential misidentifications).
100. See Gross et al., supra note 99, at 540 (finding that a substantial majority of all post-
conviction DNA exonerations had eyewitness testimony at trial and, unsurprisingly, almost all
erroneous rape cases in the group had victim-identifications at trial); see also Garrett, Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 79-88; Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 97 (finding 79% of
DNA exonerees were convicted due to an eyewitness identification).
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of evidence,' coerced confessions,° 2 fabrication of evidence,0 3 forensic
fraud,"° and inadequate defense counsel."5 Each of those areas in turn
implicates a constitutional criminal procedure right, from fair trial rights
established in decisions such as Manson v. Brathwaite, Brady v. Maryland
and Napue v. Illinois, to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
protections established in Strickland v. Washington, and Fifth Amendment
protections against police coercion0 6 Several of the DNA exonerations
have also implicated not just isolated error, but systematic problems in law
enforcement, such wholesale fabrication of forensic evidence, wide-spread
ineffective assistance of counsel, patterns of Brady violations, and patterns
of suggestive eyewitness identifications-and as a result, some
jurisdictions voluntarily adopted wholesale reforms. ' 7 False convictions
provide unusually egregious examples of "system failure," but the
important point for these purposes is not how often failures occur or how
101. According to an Innocence Project study, in 34% of all exonerations, police suppressed
exculpatory evidence. Innocence Project, Police and Prosecutorial Misconduct, available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php. Prosecutors did the same in 37% of
exonerations. Id.
102. Cases of false confessions account for approximately 16% of DNA exonerations. See Garrett,
Judging Innocence, supra note 97; Gross et al., supra note 99, at 544-45 (15% of exonerations
including non-DNA cases). For analysis of the known cases of false confessions, see Steven A. Drizin
& Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891
(2004) and Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 88-94.
103. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 97 (collecting and analyzing all post-conviction
DNA exonerations where informant testimony supported the conviction); Gross et al., supra note 99, at
544; see also Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 94-99. "Overall, in 43% of
all exonerations (146/340) at least one sort of perjury is reported," including by police officers and
subomed perjury by jailhouse snitches. Gross et al., supra note 99, at 544. Further, "[i]n at least
seventeen exoneration cases the real criminal lied under oath to get the defendant convicted." Id. at
543.
104. Possley et al., supra note 3, at I (presenting investigation of 200 death row exonerations since
1986 finding that "more than one quarter involved faulty crime lab work or testimony"); Garrett,
Judging Innocence, supra note 97 (collecting and analyzing all post-conviction DNA exonerations
where forensic evidence supported the conviction).
105. See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 97 (collecting and analyzing all post-conviction
DNA exonerations where ineffective assistance of counsel claims were brought during appeals);
Innocence Project Study, supra note 99 (finding 23% of all DNA exonerations due to bad lawyering);
see also Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 75-76.
106. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (standard prohibiting coercion
during custodial interrogations); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (entitlement to
effective assistance of defense counsel); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (describing right to
be free from suggestive eyewitness identifications); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963)
(requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (rule against bad
faith fabrication of evidence); Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 75-76.
107. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 75, 79, 87-88, 93-94, 98-99,
104 (describing reforms in response to wrongful convictions, including new eyewitness identification
procedures, open-file policies to prevent Brady violations, remedying patterns of forensic fraud in
crime laboratories, and videotaping interrogations).
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well the system detects them, but rather that the constitutional rights
implicated now lack any recognized avenue for aggregate redress.' °8
Thus, in criminal law repeat players that dominate the criminal system
achieve economies of scale through informal means. Based on the Court's
rulings discussed, however, no meaningful avenues exist for aggregate
remedies regarding systemic violations of defendants' constitutional rights.
Indeed, as discussed next, the Court hastened the end of the habeas corpus
class action, the first attempt to vindicate systemic violations of
constitutional rights in criminal cases.
D. The Demise of Federal Habeas Corpus Class Actions
In a novel strategy to remedy systemic criminal procedure violations,
courts did for a time certify class actions in federal habeas corpus
beginning in the late 19 60 s." 9 Their rise and recent decline went almost
completely unnoticed. "' The untold story of the habeas corpus class
action's demise illuminates what the criminal system would look like if
there was a role for aggregation to permit vindication of patterns of
constitutional violations. Habeas corpus could be uniquely suited to such
class action aggregation. Though it is considered a civil remedy, it permits
an appellant to collaterally challenge a criminal conviction. "I Habeas
corpus class action representatives sought to litigate common issues on
claims that criminal convictions were unconstitutional or violated federal
108. Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201 (2005).
109. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 11.4(b); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule
2(d), 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254. For early cases considering the issue, see Adderly v. Wainwright, 58
F.R.D. 389, 404 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("[lI]t is entirely proper, if not wholly necessary, in a case such as this
for a court to allow a petition for writ of habeas corpus to proceed upon an appropriate determination in
accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Mitchell v. Schoonfield, 285
F.Supp. 728 (D. Md. 1968); and Hill v. Nelson, 272 F.Supp. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1967). Also available is the
procedure of joining petitions, including for discovery or for a hearing, but not for disposition. See
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 11.4(b). Additional class actions are not habeas challenges to
convictions, but really Section 1983 class actions challenging conditions of confinement and the like.
See id. at §§ 7.2(c), 9.1, 11.4(b), 41.2.
110. The only treatment of aggregation of criminal appeals is discussion of habeas corpus class
actions in an overview in James Liebman and Randy Hertz's habeas corpus treatise, and a student note
written in 1968 describing the then-new phenomenon the year after the first habeas class action was
brought. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 1 1.4(b); Note, Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1968).
Ill. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995) ("[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable
remedy."); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) ("[H]abeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as
governed by equitable principles."); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 336 (1923) ("[H]abeas corpus
is... an independent civil suit."); see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 2.2. There is a
natural connection running from habeas corpus to aggregation and civil class actions which arose also
out of practices in equity courts. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999); see also Jack
B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269
(1991).
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law. 112 Groups of prisoners raised issues such as access to counsel in
capital cases, access to legal materials, disparate sentences for juveniles,
and the constitutionality of the death penalty. 13 For a time those actions
enjoyed some occasional success, but in the late 1990s, the habeas corpus
class action met its procedural end.
1. A Tale of Two Habeas Class Actions
Brought a decade apart, two Supreme Court decisions dismissing
habeas corpus class actions regarding representation of capital defendants
show the promise and then the end of the habeas corpus class action. The
more recent of two habeas corpus class actions that reached the Court,
Calderon v. Ashmus, 114 was brought in California in 1996 to settle a
statutory question important to death row inmates. Congress had legislated
that "opt-in" states providing competent counsel to capital defendants
could impose a 180-day limitations period to file a habeas petition, rather
than the typical one-year period. "I For obvious reasons, death row
prisoners wanted to know in advance which limitations period applied to
them. A California class sought a declaration that the state did not provide
competent counsel to capital defendants and thus that the one year
limitations period applied. The district court certified the class and held
that California did not meet the conditions for "opt-in."' 6 The Court of
Appeals and then the Supreme Court reversed. The Court ruled that class
members could not obtain advance ruling on issues that were unripe since
none had filed a habeas petition yet, and thus, courts had not ruled first
112. Samuel Issacharoff notes the reverse irony that if civil class members could collaterally
challenge class litigation, they would have substantial rights unavailable to prisoners during a collateral
appeal given the "restrictive development of recent habeas jurisprudence." See Issacharoff,
Governance, supra note 44, at 372.
113. Habeas class actions brought by groups in numbers less than twenty are cited below and infra
notes 116, 118, 123, 138. See Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]his
court has held that a class action may lie in habeas corpus"); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506
F.2d 1115, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding habeas class action appropriate in challenge by juvenile
detainees to sentencing imposed in excess of what adults would receive); Williams v. Richardson, 481
F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (concluding habeas class action may be appropriate); Mead v. Parker,
464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding in regards to the twenty-seven inmates who filed a habeas class
action regarding access to legal materials that "the relief sought can be of immediate benefit to a large
and amorphous group"); Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F.Supp 4 (D. Ariz. 1980) (ruling on class challenge to
capital sentencing statute); Jackson v. Justices, 423 F.Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1976) (staying proceedings
against putative class of juveniles indicted after complaints were dismissed); Adderly v. Wainwright,
58 F.R.D. 389, 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (certifying and granting relief to class action of Florida capital
prisoners challenging death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment).
114. 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000).
116. Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F.Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding certification of a
mandatory class appropriate in case on behalf of all California capital prisoners, challenging
California's failure to provide competent capital counsel).
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whether each of the class members had properly exhausted all of their
claims in the state courts." 7
Justice Breyer dissented in Ashmus, emphasizing that aggregation
serves important purposes in our system of justice. He explained that the
declaratory relief sought would provide a "relatively expeditious judicial
answer" to the limitations question and would avoid disarray where
prisoners might otherwise file premature (or late) petitions. Justice
Breyer's dissent has great force. The Court encouraged needless confusion
and motion practice among hundreds of petitioners in the district courts,"'
and refused to decide a discrete question that would "provide legal
guidance for others."' 9 The Court required a court to do the impossible
before certifying a habeas corpus class action-undertake decisions
regarding complex individual procedural questions before reaching any
common issues to the group. The result meant the end of the habeas corpus
class action.'20
The Court's decision in Ashmus provided a mirror image to its
decision ten years earlier in Murray v. Giarratano,"' in which the Court
reached the merits of a class action on a similar issue. In Giarratano, a
class of all Virginia death row inmates contended they were
constitutionally entitled to counsel for state post-conviction proceedings,
particularly the mentally disabled class members who could not represent
themselves.' The District Court certified the class, found such a right, and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'23 While the plaintiff inmates in Giarratano
had not yet brought collateral proceedings in state court, the Supreme
Court did not discuss, as it did in Ashmus, the propriety of reaching a
117. The Court stated: "[l]f respondent Ashmus is allowed to maintain the present action, he
would obtain a declaration as to the applicable statute of limitations in a federal habeas action without
ever having shown that he has exhausted state remedies." Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 748
(1998).
118. The Third Circuit ruled differently when a class of Pennsylvania capital prisoners filed a
habeas class action seeking a declaration to clarify that the state had not provided competent counsel,
and thus that they should be able to take advantage of the one-year limitations period. See Death Row
Prisoners of Pa. v. Ridge, 948 F.Supp 1258, 1263 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit agreed that an
advance ruling on the issue would be desirable and in response the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
conceded it did not qualify as an "opt-in" state. Id.
119. 523 U.S. at 750 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120. See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
121. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
122. The district court certified a class of "all persons, now and in the future, sentenced to death in
Virginia, whose sentences have been or are subsequently affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court" and
who could not afford and did not have counsel post-conviction. Id. at 4. The court stylized the action as
a Section 1983 class action, but like in Ashmus the court sought to clarify issues regarding post-
conviction appeals.
123. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F.Supp. 511, 512 (E.D. Va. 1986), affd en banc, 847 F.2d 1118
(4th Cir. 1988).
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constitutional issue. Instead the Court reached the merits and found no
right to counsel post-conviction.'24
The Court's decision in Giarratano in two other senses did vindicate
rights of the class. First, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion providing
the fifth vote, and joined by Justice O'Connor, indicated a more flexible
approach that stated whether a right to counsel attached might be a
different question if someone were to be executed without a lawyer, and
noting that Virginia's system provided "'institutional lawyers to assist in
preparing petitions for postconviction relief."' 125 In response, Virginia
began appointing attorneys for habeas corpus appeals in capital cases-
thus, the suit did accomplish one goal.126
Second, there is a far deeper irony of the Murray v. Giarratano class
action lawsuit that has only recently risen to the surface. The suit was
brought pro se as a class action by death row inmate Joe Giarratano, a
"jailhouse lawyer," as a class action, largely because of his concern for a
fellow inmate, Earl Washington Jr., who could not bring a case himself
because he had "an IQ of 69, an execution date three weeks away, and no
lawyer."1"7 As it turned out, Giarrantano's class action did succeed in
obtaining representation for Washington, by drawing the attention of a
large New York law firm to work on Washington's case pro bono. 2 ' The
firm succeeded in obtaining a stay, although Washington came within nine
days of execution. 129 As we now know, Earl Washington was actually
innocent of the rape and murder charges of which he was convicted.
Eighteen years later, the Governor pardoned him based on DNA testing of
evidence from the victim that did not match Washington, but rather
matched a man in the state's DNA database. 3' What has also emerged
since is that the Virginia Crime Laboratory had both in 1994 and later in
2002, according to outside experts, falsified evidence to imply that
Washington could still be guilty.'3 ' This "enormous botched job," led to
ongoing audits of the crime lab; one such audit so far has led to DNA
exonerations of two other prisoners who spent a combined thirty-one years
in prison for crimes that they did not commit. 32
124. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1989). The Court earlier held that the right to counsel
is limited to the direct appeal. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
125. Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital
Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2006) (citation omitted); see
Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. See MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN, THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON, JR. 93 (2003).
127. Id. at 83.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 83, 92.
130. Id. at 166, 169-76, 186-87, 193-95.
131. See Laura LaFay, Reasonable Doubt, STYLE WKLY., July 6, 2005, at 2, 7-8.
132. Id.; see Michael D. Shear & Jamie Stockwell, DNA Tests Exonerate 2 Former Prisoners; Va.
Governor Orders Broad Case Review, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at Al (Governor Mark Warner
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Aggregation may be no boon for criminal defendants; after all, the
Giarratano class action resulted in the Court's ruling that capital
defendants may lack rights to post-conviction counsel. On the other hand,
only by using an aggregate mechanism, the class action, could Giarrantano
obtain representation for Washington, who could not represent himself.
That representation had system-wide consequences, resulting in not just
legal representation but also the exoneration of an innocent man, then
raising deep institutional questions about our criminal justice system,
including coercive fabrication of a confession by a mentally disabled man
and outright forensic fraud by a leading crime lab. Aggregation may also
achieve significant judicial economy goals regardless of whether appellants
prevail. As Justice Breyer notes in his Ashmus dissent, courts may use
aggregation to resolve economically alike claims that otherwise might be
impracticable to remedy. Yet the Court in Ashmus seemed to effectively
bar habeas corpus class actions.
2. Why Habeas Class Actions Vanished
The Supreme Court's decision in Ashmus, based on an individualized
conception of criminal procedure, together with the AEDPA and additional
procedural hurdles developed by the Court, hastened the end of habeas
corpus class action litigation. 133 While the Court never formally ruled
whether a habeas corpus class action could be maintained,' the Court held
in Ashmus that a petitioner cannot obtain advance ruling on common issues
without having a court rule first whether all class members properly
exhausted their individual claims in state courts.' The Supreme Court thus
requires lower courts to enter a "maze of procedural barriers" at the outset
of each individual habeas corpus petition before they may reach issues
common to the class.
36
The Court's ruling making the habeas corpus class action all but
impossible seems misplaced and unduly burdens lower courts, states, and
pardoned two men, one who served twenty-one years for a rape and another who served eleven years
for an assault, after a retesting of thirty-one cases; the Governor ordered that the retesting be expanded
to 660 boxes of case files).
133. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (2000).
134. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 30 (1976) ("Because of our disposition of this case on
the merits, we have no occasion to reach the question of whether Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 23, providing
for class actions, is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus."); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5
(1969) ("The applicability to habeas corpus of the rules concerning joinder and class actions has
engendered considerable debate."); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979).
135. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747-48 (1998).
136. Reinhardt, supra note 85, at 319 ("[Courts] cannot even reach what is now usually the easier
question: whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights."). The AEDPA provides
petitions may be dismissed on the merits even if unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2) (2000);
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 23.1. Some federal courts have proceeded by "simply ignoring"
the Court's statements that procedural defenses "ordinarily should be" considered before the merits. See
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 22.1 & n.3 1.
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petitioners. The Court could have ratified the innovations of lower courts
that efficiently resolved preliminary issues common to groups of habeas
petitions. As Justice Breyer recognized, habeas corpus class actions
provided great benefits in the presentation of common factual and legal
questions. As the Second Circuit also recognized, class actions could save
"considerable expenditure of judicial time and energy."' 37 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit noted that habeas corpus class actions reduce caseloads and
address "the common claims of a large group of petitioners ... without
endangering the individual rights of the class." 138 A class action may
provide the only opportunity for representation, given no constitutional
right to counsel during habeas corpus and the fact that most prisoners
proceed pro se. '39
Yet the Court did not discuss a separate and valid reason why habeas
corpus class actions can no longer be brought (though it may have been a
background concern). That is preclusion, which creates a far harsher
procedural barrier to habeas corpus class actions. In the 1990s, the Court
and then Congress with the AEDPA imposed strict limitations on raising
the same or different issues in a second or successive habeas petition. 4
That preclusion rule might not only prevent class members from
maintaining subsequent individual challenges as to the same legal issue,'
but could also prevent any subsequent relief at all, even as to issues not
raised in the class action,' 42 and perhaps even if an opt-out is provided.'43
While no court has considered the impact of the AEDPA's successive
petition limitation for a habeas corpus class action, the harsh rule provides
good reason why none have been brought since Ashmus was decided. A
class action might preclude criminal defendants who lack individual
representation from ever later bringing an individual petition.'
44
137. United States ex reL Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974).
138. Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973).
139. See Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1126 ("because many of those serving reformatory sentences are
likely to be illiterate or poorly educated, and since most would not have the benefit of counsel to
prepare habeas corpus petitions, it is not improbable that more than a few would otherwise never
receive the relief here sought on their behalf"); Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 405 (M.D. Fla.
1972) (habeas class actions may "make meaningful that which otherwise may be only so many
words: the availability of a federal forum").
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (3)(A) (2000); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 11.4(b).
141. See Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that petitioner was
bound by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in a prior class action brought on behalf of all Florida
death row inmates challenging use of exparte materials).
142. In such circumstances class adjudication might "substantially impair or impede" the rights of
class members. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
143. See Brewer v. Swinson, 837 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1988) (permitting class member to
withdraw from action challenging parole guidelines to pursue own case).
144. 1 discuss in Part 11 how aggregation could still reach common questions raised post-
conviction in the absence of a harsh preclusion rule. Further, even within the AEDPA's confines, courts
could still use consolidation.
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Thus, the Court adopted a highly individualized conception of
criminal adjudication which, together with the statutory obstacles, made
habeas corpus class actions impossible to bring despite the substantial
benefits of permitting vindication of systemic criminal procedure
problems. The lower courts have now successfully developed new forms of
aggregation that seek to permit the same vindication of systemic violations
of criminal procedure rights, and in doing so, have redefined conceptions
of a criminal law day in court, aggregation, and due process.
II
CRIMINAL LAW AGGREGATION: FIVE CASE STUDIES
The Supreme Court drew a line in the sand. The Court reiterated in its
rulings regarding criminal procedure rights and sentencing guidelines that
criminal defendants retain a strict individual right to a day in court
regarding proof of elements of a crime. Regarding such questions of guilt
or innocence, aggregation has no place in criminal law. Further, not only
did the Court rule out civil class actions for most criminal procedure rights
and all criminal trial rights, but even during collateral appeals, the Court
also emphasized individualized treatment of federal habeas corpus petitions
to prevent aggregation. The Supreme Court's apparent hard line
nevertheless left lower courts room to adopt a range of significant
aggregative innovations in criminal cases. Thus, constitutional boundaries
on both the civil and criminal sides remain far more practically and
conceptually permeable than they appear. I will show how lower courts
elide the Supreme Court's central concern to prevent aggregation at trial
regarding elements of a crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lower courts instead aggregated criminal cases regarding criminal
procedure rights asserted at pre-trial hearings or post-conviction.
These courts aggregate using mechanisms that resemble both class
actions and judicial consolidation. They assemble actions like issue class
actions regarding common issues relevant to criminal procedure claims. In
other respects, the actions resemble the least controversial Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions in that they chiefly provide injunctive relief. In addition, some
courts avoid some of the procedural concerns of class actions by instead
consolidating cases and placing parties before a single court that can then
decide common issues or claims.'45 Federal courts 14 6 and state courts retain
inherent power to consolidate cases in specialized proceedings. 147
145. See discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and civil consolidation supra Part I.C.
146. In federal courts, case management remains within equitable discretion and "inherent power,"
"to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see
also Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (emphasizing "the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants"); In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 306-07, 312-14 (1920) (recognizing "inherent
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One dramatic difference between the criminal and civil systems is that
unlike civil courts of general jurisdiction, state criminal courts that hear
only criminal cases are themselves repeat players regarding the very
criminal procedure rights that defendants are asserting. Thus, systemic
intervention to prevent mass violations of those rights is a form of
institutional self-policing. In this Part, I show the breadth of models that
lower courts have used to aggregate, presenting below five case
studies: four state supreme courts and a federal circuit court that used
inherent power to aggregate criminal cases. These courts aggregated to
reach a range of problems that otherwise might not be remedied,
including: patterns of forensic fraud, inadequate indigent representation,
racial disparity in capital sentencing, and summary dismissals of habeas
petitions. In each effort, systemic problems were uncovered, detected,
tracked, and remedied due to the initiative of courts using aggregation.
These innovative procedures suggest that a day in court in criminal law
may be more complex than the traditional criminal jury trial model
suggests. Last, I will discuss how the federal court wavered, and a second
federal court outright failed to aggregate, in both cases illustrating costs of
failing to provide an aggregate remedy for a systemic problem. This will
connect to the theme of Part III, in which I will argue the Court should
embrace such efforts to permit remedies for systemic criminal procedure
violations and to reconceptualize its individualized model for criminal
adjudication.
Finally, while in civil cases the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set
out requirements for various types of aggregation to protect the due process
rights of parties bound; in criminal cases, however, the procedural
requirements for aggregation remain murky and untested. I will describe
which civil categories each case study suggests, though they are not
formally applied, to show that the full range of civil aggregative techniques
may be used in criminal law, bringing with them many of the same
substantial benefits. In Part III, I examine the ways such actions raise the
same due process concerns courts have addressed in civil cases, and will
develop a framework for analyzing the procedural and constitutional
implications of aggregation in criminal law. I turn now to describing how
power" of federal court to appoint auditors, special masters, or commissioners to aid the judge in fact-
finding and understanding complex issues).
147. On appeal, federal circuit courts have discretion to consolidate cases before them for joint-
decision, when it is efficient, or in the interests of justice. See FED. R. App. P. 3(b)(3); United States v.
Washington, 573 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Consolidation under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(b) may be ordered where the court in its discretion deems it appropriate and in the interests
of justice."). Regarding state courts, see, e.g., Sampson v. Sapoznik, 117 Cal. App. 2d 607, 609 (2d
Dist. 1953) ("[lit is a factual question as to whether the questions presented are so related as to make it
advisable to consolidate and whether the consideration of the appeals will be expedited by the
consolidation .. ") and Paducah & I.R. Co. v. Albritton, 191 S.W. 879, 880 (Ky. App. 1917) (stating
that "appeals may for convenience and the dispatch of business be heard together").
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five courts responded to systemic criminal procedure problems with
aggregative solutions.
A. West Virginia: Fabrication of Forensic Evidence
The Supreme Court has long held that "a State may not knowingly
use false evidence" during criminal proceedings. 148 In the past decade,
fabrication of evidence has arisen as a prominent problem, as forensic
science laboratory analysts engaged in repeated fraud, perjury, or shoddy
work that have caused criminal justice scandals resembling mass tort
litigation.149 In two of the most notorious instances, the misconduct of
Joyce Gilchrist in Oklahoma and Fred Zain in West Virginia at their
respective crime labs affected hundreds of criminal cases and resulted in
judicial exoneration of at least ten prisoners. 150
In Oklahoma, as early as 1988, a series of state courts found Gilchrist
presented misleading if not false evidence, but those courts took no further
action to systematically investigate her or the state crime laboratory.'51 In
2001, the Governor finally ordered review of the thousands of cases
Gilchrist worked on, but only after six wrongful convictions came to light
through DNA testing.1
5 2
In contrast, the West Virginia criminal justice system formally
responded to the Zain misconduct by treating the problem of forensic fraud
as a group harm. The state's highest court, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, convened an extraordinary investigation following what
began with a single post-conviction petition for habeas corpus. The court
began by appointing the Honorable James 0. Holliday, a retired circuit
148. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
149. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 95-99 (summarizing
literature on use of "junk science" and describing controversy regarding Montana, Texas, Virginia, and
Cleveland crime laboratories); Possley et al., supra note 3, at 1, (presenting investigation of 200 death
row exonerations since 1986 and finding that more than one quarter involved faulty crime lab work or
testimony).
150. Possley et al., supra note 3, at 1.
151. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) ("Ms. Gilchrist's pretrial
forensic report made absolutely no mention of her finding of a 'unique characteristic' concerning
appellant's pubic hairs .... this significant omission... resulted in trial by ambush on a very critical
piece of evidence."); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) ("While we cannot
take Gilchrist's breach of the law lightly, neither can we find that it was reversible error under the facts
of this case."); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ("Gilchrist's so-called
expert opinion was actually a personal opinion beyond the scope of present scientific capabilities.");
see also Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562, 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) ("The lack of scientific weight of
[Gilchrist's] conclusion is apparent."). Jeffrey Pierce was later exonerated by DNA testing after being
wrongly convicted for fifteen years, shedding scientific light on Gilchrist's fraud. Possley et al., supra
note 3, at 1. Similarly, Robert Miller was later exonerated by DNA testing. See Jim Yardley, Inquiry
Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A 14.
152. See Yardley, supra note 151, at Al 4. A federal civil suit seeks damages against Gilchrist and
other individuals and municipal entities. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (10th Cir.
2004).
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judge, to supervise an investigation of the Serology Division at the West
Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory.'53 Holliday in turn appointed a
team of scientists from the Laboratory Accreditation Board of the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), to investigate
the policies, procedures, and work of the laboratory,'54 as well as a special
prosecutor and the Chief Public Defender to conduct the litigation.'
Holliday's report notes that the ASCLD team concluded that fraud by
Zain was "the result of systematic practice rather than an occasional
inadvertent error."'56 Examining why the crime laboratory did not detect
this repeat fraud, the judge found shocking failures, including:
(1) no written documentation of testing methodology;
(2) no written quality assurance program; (3) no written
internal or external auditing procedures; (4) no routine proficiency
testing of laboratory technicians; (5) no technical review
of work product; (6) no written documentation of instrument
maintenance and calibration; (7) no written testing procedures
manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted scientific testing
standards with respect to certain tests; (9) inadequate record-
keeping; and (10) failure to conduct collateral testing.15 7
The court ordered the West Virginia Division of Public Safety to file
with the Clerk of the Court within sixty days a report outlining steps they
would take to immediately obtain certification of the State Police forensic
laboratory by the ASCLD' 58
Finally, the court made rulings that would be binding in all cases in
which evidence by Zain was presented (more than 133), holding that
further review was required, and that for efficiency reasons, "in light of the
overwhelming evidence, further litigation of whether Trooper Zain's
misconduct significantly tainted his participation in numerous criminal
prosecutions is unwarranted."'59 Instead, all cases in which Zain's evidence
"would have been sufficient to support the verdict" would be reversed, any
153. In re an Investigation of The W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501,
502-03 (W. Va. 1993). The Court only did so following settlement with Glen Dale Woodall, who filed
a civil suit after being wrongly convicted for five years based on Zain's fabricated evidence; an initial
inquiry by the State's insurer; an initial internal audit finding no errors made; and finally, at the request
of a county prosecutor. Id. at 509-10.
154. See id. at 503.
155. Seeid. at510.
156. Id. at 503. The Report cited a separate report by the Laboratory Accreditation Board of the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), finding that Zain committed a range of
misconduct, from "overstating the strength of results" to misreporting genetic matches, "reporting
inconclusive results as conclusive," "repeatedly altering laboratory records," "grouping results to create
the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested," "failing to
report conflicting results," and "reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results." Id.
157. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 504.
158. Id. at 508.
159. Id. at 506.
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additional DNA testing would be performed by an independent laboratory
at the State's expense, and persons who made guilty pleas based on Zain's
evidence would also be permitted a chance to withdraw their pleas. 160 Thus,
the court-sponsored investigation, involving outside scientific auditors,
depositions by prosecutors, and defense counsel, ultimately both lead to
group reversals of convictions 161 and structural reform of the crime
laboratory. 162 The West Virginia court creatively devised a novel and
effective aggregate remedy for what it called a serious "corruption of our
legal system.' 1 6
3
The saga has not ended. After yet another investigation, this time
extending beyond just those that Zain worked on, the West Virginia
Supreme Court concluded in 2006 that there was evidence of larger
impropriety in the laboratory.1" While the court did not find intentional
misconduct by other serologists, it found errors that were "frequent,
recurring and multifaceted, spanning the spectrum of examiners," and that
the errors represented "a divergence from good science and on occasion
ethical conduct" raising "a strong inference that the problems were
systemic in the Serology Division." 165 While not adopting the same
presumption as in the cases Zain worked on, the court ruled that all
prisoners against whom any West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory
serologist testified are entitled to a "full habeas corpus hearing on the issue
of the serology evidence," to representation by counsel at the hearing, and
to have the ordinary procedural rules suspended to permit prisoners who
had already filed for habeas relief to file a second habeas petition regarding
the serology issue. 166 Thus, the Court provided even more sweeping relief
to all prisoners potentially affected by serologists at the laboratory. The
court then concluded by noting that though "beyond its purview" the
appropriate authorities should carefully consider "removing the Crime Lab
from State Police supervision and placing it under an independent agency"
with independent supervision and auditing.167
The aggregation effectively uncovered, analyzed, and then remedied
deep problems at the state crime laboratory, but the court did not discuss
the procedural basis for its approach. It is useful to consider whether
160. Id. at 506-08.
161. Nine convictions were subsequently reversed. See Kit R. Roane & Dan Morrison, The CSI
Effect, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 48.
162. The investigation initially failed to audit non-Zain cases or investigate whether superiors
covered up Zain's fabrications, stating that "[e]vidence regarding whether Zain's supervisors ignored or
concealed complaints of his misconduct is conflicting and the issue beyond the scope of this
investigation." See In re an Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 515.
163. Id. at 508.
164. In re Renewed Investigation of State Police Crime Lab., 633 S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 2006).
165. Id. at 764.
166. Id. at 769.
167. Id. at 771.
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additional rights would have been provided in a civil case. If the court had
consolidated the parties before the court, then each of the criminal
defendants should have been represented by counsel. Yet the cases of
prisoners were not before the court, because they were only identified
through the efforts of the expert auditors. 68 Though the group
representation resembled a class action, its members had not yet been
identified or contacted.'69 Only after the Court concluded the laboratory
engaged in fraud did it order that all prisoners potentially affected should
be notified of their right to seek relief, including possible reversal of their
conviction. 7 °
The court's use of group representation resembles a class action-yet
not only did the court not provide notice, but the court did not conduct
hearings regarding adequacy of representation. One explanation is that
during post-conviction review, prisoners lacked an underlying right to any
counsel. 7 ' The Supreme Court held that functional "due process concerns"
guide when right to counsel attaches during criminal appeals.' Perhaps
appointment of counsel should be required in aggregate proceedings that
affect systemic rights. That reason may explain why the court ensured that
the public defender's office was involved and appointed a special master
and outside experts. Aggregation may thus have provided superior
representation than otherwise available post conviction.
A still better explanation is that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals did not decide the claims of individual petitioners, but rather
decided limited common issues on criminal procedure rights that
defendants could still assert later in their individual cases. The court
carefully ruled only on issues common to the group regarding whether the
crime laboratory was corrupt, and left for lower courts whether individual
relief should be granted.'73 The court bifurcated the action, as in civil Rule
23(c)(4) issues-only class actions in which common issues are decided
but remaining factual or damages issues are tried individually. 174
The West Virginia court also, in effect, ordered injunctive structural
reform of the crime laboratory. The aggregate remedy provided resembles
the Rule 23(b)(2) category of "mandatory" class actions without an opt-out
168. Id. at 510 ("On June 17, 1993, it was determined that the records reflected 133 cases in which
Zain had made positive identification of either the suspect or the victim.").
169. See id. at 510 ("George Castelle, Chief Public Defender of Kanawha County, was appointed
public defender to represent in this investigation prisoners whose convictions might be affected.").
170. See id. at 507-08.
171. See supra note 147.
172. Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582, 2587 (2005). The Court held that states must provide
counsel during direct appeals as of right, but not during post-conviction review; the Court functionally
examined the purpose of an appeal and whether its purpose is to define criminal procedure rights, or
conduct individual review. See id. at 2586, 2590.
173. See discussion of issues-only class actions supra Part I.C.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
2007]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
right, regarding injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.'75 The
court's decision regarding whether the crime laboratory was corrupt or not
and what procedures should be put into place at the laboratory and in lower
courts in effect resolved those questions for the group. Thus, the West
Virginia prisoners did not receive any right to opt-out. Civil cases
recognize that given a homogenous class, such relief does not adversely
affect class members because no individual issues are decided. In Part IIl, I
will expand on why such aggregation satisfies due process, but for present
purposes note that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals carefully
limited the scope of its aggregation to safeguard the rights of petitioners
affected.
B. Louisiana: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Louisiana court used a method of aggregation similar to the West
Virginia court's method to address the persistent problem of inadequate
indigent defense counsel, but at a different stage-aggregating criminal
procedure rights asserted by criminal defendants before trial. Appellants
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel normally face the U.S. Supreme
Court's difficult to satisfy Strickland test, which asks whether the
substandard performance of counsel was so prejudicial that, based on the
totality of the evidence, it affected the outcome at trial. Under this test,
courts need not reach the merits of a claim if they conclude that any
potential error by counsel would have been harmless.'76 Rather than apply a
post-conviction test that does not effectively address the problem of
inadequate counsel, the Louisiana court addressed the problem beforehand
in a systemic way separate from the difficult factual questions in individual
cases.
The Louisiana court aggregated adequacy of counsel claims in State v.
Peart.77 New Orleans resident Leonard Peart was charged in 1993 with
murder, armed robbery and aggravated rape among other crimes.178 His
counsel, Richard Teissier, of the Orleans Indigent Defender Program
(OIDP), filed a pretrial claim urging the court that, like his colleagues in
the OIDP, he could not provide effective assistance of counsel to his clients
due to his oppressively large caseload and inadequate resources."'
In response, the Chief Judge in the District Court of the Parish of
Orleans, Calvin Johnson, treated the problem as a systemic issue. Judge
Johnson held a series of consolidated hearings on the defense services
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
176. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
177. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
178. Id. at 784. For additional discussion of the case, see Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure
of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1731(2005).
179. Peart, 621 So.2d at 784.
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provided to Peart and other criminal defendants. 8 ' The court found that
Teissier was handling 70 active felony cases and 418 defendants in total. 8'
Teissier had no investigator and no funding to hire experts. He had so
many clients that they were "routinely incarcerated 30 to 70 days before he
[met] with them."' 82 Judge Johnson found that "[n]ot even a lawyer with an
S on his chest could effectively" handle Teissier's docket. 8 3 Judge Johnson
not only concluded that Teissier could not effectively represent his clients,
he also concluded that New Orleans's entire system of indigent defense
was unconstitutional. He required the legislature to provide additional
funding to hire investigators, support staff, expert witnesses, and
attorneys. 184 As a result, Peart received additional resources for his case,
resulting in his acquittal on the charges against him in two separate trials.'85
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana asked whether it was
appropriate for the trial judge to "consolidate motions filed on behalf of
multiple defendants charged with unrelated crimes," when the motions all
allege ineffective assistance by the same public defender.'86 The court held
that consolidated hearings were appropriate to gather evidence efficiently,
but that "the true inquiry is whether an individual defendant has been
provided with reasonably effective assistance."' 87 The court ruled that the
trial court must "examine each case individually," 188 but nevertheless
agreed with Judge Johnson that indigent criminal defendants in New
Orleans received constitutionally inadequate counsel.89 Using its inherent
power to fashion remedies to administer justice, the court established a
"rebuttable presumption" that indigent criminal defendants represented by
the OIDP lacked effective assistance of counsel. As a result, defendants
represented by the OIDP in the future could rely on that presumption,
subject to the state's rebuttal, to secure "reasonably effective assistance of
counsel" from the trial court.19° Although it declined to order the legislature
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 789.
184. Id. at 784-85.
185. Peart, 621 So.2d at 785, 785 n.4.
186. Id. at 788.
187. Id. at 788 (emphasis in original) ("[N]o general finding by the trial court regarding a given
lawyer's handling of other cases, or workload generally, can answer that very specific question as to an
individual defendant and the defense being furnished him.").
188. Id. at 788-91. The Supreme Court's test for ineffective assistance of counsel asserted post-
conviction, for example, requires an individual showing of prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). The prejudice test avoids the need for courts to examine systemic
inadequacies: "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed," because "the entire
criminal justice system" should not have to "suffer" the burden of such claims. Id.
189. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784.
190. Id. at 791.
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to take action for separation of powers reasons, the court recommended
legislative action. In response the legislature created a state-funded
Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board and provided millions of
dollars in additional funding.19'
This chain of events prompted further system-wide legislation and
funding, though gross inadequacies persisted over time.'92 The Louisiana
Supreme Court recently ruled that prosecutions may be halted if a
municipality refuses to make timely indigent defense funding available.' 9'
Five other state supreme courts have also intervened in individual and
consolidated criminal cases to order that states or municipalities provide
adequate representation to indigent defendants, with Arizona applying a
similar presumption of inadequacy.194
The Supreme Court of Louisiana adopted an aggregative procedure in
which it decided the common legal and factual issue of the criminal
procedure right to effective assistance was decided for the entire Parish of
New Orleans. The court also ruled on criminal procedure rights before
trial, rather than during post-conviction appeals. Like the West Virginia
court, the Louisiana Supreme Court in effect created an issue class action,
conducting consolidated hearings for Peart and others represented by
attorney Teissier, but then granting relief to all defendants represented by
public defenders in the Parish.
191. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:151 (2005) (establishing Louisiana Indigent Defense
Assistance Board); State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2005) (discussing the legislature's
creation in 2003 of a "blue ribbon" Louisiana Task Force on Indigent Defense Services to study the
problem and make reform recommendations); Lee Hargrave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974; How Did They Fare?, 58 LA. L. REV. 389, 398 n.45 (1998) (noting that the
legislature increased indigent defense funding by $5 million after the decision in Peart, and that two
years later, it appropriated another $7.5 million for the same purpose).
192. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-The-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) ("Over time, the money failed to keep up with
inflation and caseloads, and today New Orleans defense counsel still have heavy caseloads.").
193. See Citizen, 898 So. 2d at 339 (establishing procedures to suspend prosecution if no
adequately compensated counsel was provided in a timely fashion).
194. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that if the County of
Mohave continued to impose "crushing" caseloads on contract counsel and fail to pay based on the
work required in a case, "there will be an inference that the adequacy of representation is adversely
affected by the system"); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990)
(ordering "massive" employment of the private bar to handle backlog of thousands of appellate cases in
six Florida counties, and stating that if the legislature did not order funds for such counsel, the court
would entertain habeas corpus petitions for release pending appeal); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747
P.2d 816, 849-59 (Kan. 1987) (finding that the state of Kansas's system of indigent defense
unconstitutional and requiring that the state provide fair compensation to indigent defense counsel);
State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Mo. 1981) (establishing procedures for evaluation
and appointment of indigent counsel and requiring dismissal of indictment upon motion if no adequate
counsel is timely appointed); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Okla. 1990) (requiring parity and
hourly pay for indigent defenders tied to pay for prosecutors). But see Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d
149, 161 (Ind. 1999) (evidence of systemic inadequacies insufficient to demonstrate individual
ineffective assistance). In contrast, federal courts have abstained from jurisdiction in civil suits
regarding indigent representation. See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673,679 (11 th Cir. 1992).
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Like the court in West Virginia, the court in Louisiana also employed
a bifurcated approach, in which it addressed the common question of law
and fact shared by all defendants separately from individual issues in
defendants' cases. The court adopted a presumption that the New Orleans
Parish provided ineffective indigent counsel, though in each case a
defendant would have to show poor performance.' 95 As in West Virginia,
this procedure resembled an issues-only or bifurcated civil class action and
made it possible to decide common issues without ruling on claims of
individual petitioners who lacked representation or participation, and
perhaps notice of the aggregate proceedings. Although they lacked
representation in the aggregate proceeding, individual defendants could
still affirmatively assert the presumption of ineffective counsel later, and
the result would depend on the facts of their indigent representation. As
discussed in Part III, such novel separation of individual from group issues
may solve the due process problem in cases that would otherwise risk
unconstitutionality.
C. Connecticut and New Jersey:
Race and Proportionality in Capital Sentencing
1. Connecticut
The Supreme Court of Connecticut faced a complex "public law"
dispute-five cases in which death row prisoners brought proportionality
challenges alleging racial disparity in Connecticut's system of
capital sentencing.'96 Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v.
Georgia, a state supreme court must consider whether a "sentence of death
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant." '97 The court employed an
aggregative procedure to address the allegations of racial disparity.
The state Office of the Public Defender had collected data on race in
capital sentencing and retained an expert to analyze the data and prepare a
report.1 98 In response to the expert's report and the claims raised by five
death row prisoners, the court ordered that the racial discrimination claims
be consolidated "before the same habeas judge and in the same general,
consolidated hearing, on behalf of all defendants who have been sentenced
to death."' 99 The court cited fairness and efficiency concerns mirroring
those in class actions cases, stating that consolidation was appropriate
given "judicial economy, as well as fairness to both defendants and the
195. See supra Part 11.B.1.
196. State v. Webb, 280 A.2d 147 (1996). See infra notes 198-202.
197. See428 U.S. 153, 167 (1976).
198. See State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 376-86 (Conn. 2003); State v. Breton, 824 A.2d 778,
824 (Conn. 2003); State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1,499 & n.105 (Conn. 1999).
199. Reynolds, 836 A.2d at 233.
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state 2 0 0 so that the questions raised could be "resolved at the trial level in
one proceeding, rather than several. 20'
The court undertook a "court supervised statistical analysis of
[Connecticut's] capital sentencing scheme, from intake to disposition,"
itself a noteworthy enterprise. 202 Because preliminary data indicated
substantial racial disparity, two justices concluded that the system might
well be "fundamentally flawed. '20 3 The Supreme Court then appointed
former Chief Justice Robert Callahan as a special master to
oversee the consolidated proportionality litigation.2 01 Thus, a respected and
experienced judge now supervises the consolidated proceedings. The
Connecticut procedure resembles civil consolidation, in which cases are
joined for hearings and decisions on common issues. 2 5 The litigation is
still pending.206 The New Jersey example discussed next illustrates a still
more elaborated form of consolidation in which courts placed capital cases
before a special master.
2. New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court initially adopted procedures similar to
those adopted in Connecticut after a capital defendant raised a claim
alleging lack of proportionality and racial disparity in death sentencing.0 7
The court found insufficient evidence to support the defendant's claim but
ordered further examination.2 8 It appointed a retired judge as special
master to investigate the claim. The court also appointed a sitting judge as
a second special master to study the problem and review additional data
from the Administrative Office of the Courts.209 The court next ruled that it
would consolidate all additional capital cases raising race discrimination
claims, making clear that its ruling would be binding on all pending capital
200. Id.
201. Id. at 234.
202. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 676 n.3 (Conn. 2005) (Norcott, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 677 (Dranginis, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 582 n.4 (litigation was pending as of January 2005). See also Death Penalty Act. 2001
Conn. Acts 151 (Reg. Sess.), § 4(a) (convening a commission to study the death penalty in
Connecticut); Anna-Lisa Joseloff, Note, Connecticut's Capital Punishment Scheme: Still Tinkering
With The Machinery Of Death, 23 Q. L. REV. 889 (2004).
207. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 154 (N.J. 1999).
208. See id. In 1996, the Court appointed retired Superior Court Judge Richard S. Cohen as
Special Master to "conduct a review, perform analyses, and make findings and recommendations
relating to defendants' race as a possible factor in the decision of juries to impose the death penalty."
Id. Dr. John Tukey, Professor Emeritus of Statistics at Princeton University, served as technical
consultant to Judge Cohen. Id. The Court agreed with the Special Master's conclusion that the data did
not conclusively show race discrimination but that further study was warranted. Id. at 154-56.
209. In re Proportionality Review Project, 735 A.2d 528, 532-33 (N.J. 1999); see also In re
Proportionality Review Project II, 757 A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000); DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT TO THE NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT: SYSTEMJC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT (1999).
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cases in the state. It later ruled that as data analysis was updated annually,
the court would rule separately on the merits of that year's cases.2"'
After reviewing more comprehensive data, the Special Master decided
that review should extend to death-eligible cases in which prosecutors
chose not to seek the death penalty.2 ' The Special Master made a series of
recommendations which the court adopted, resulting in a new system of
proportionality review for capital cases in the state, a permanent special
master to conduct ongoing data collection about all death-eligible cases,
and reform of the sub-categories a jury considers in finding aggravating
or mitigating factors."' Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court not only
recognized a problem with its capital sentencing system, and not only
analyzed data and applied a solution, but developed and incorporated new
models and new analysis.2"3 The court convened an ongoing project to
refine capital sentencing and improve proportionality by pooling data and
conducting statistical analysis.214
The New Jersey court used a method similar to civil law consolidation
to resolve common issues in a group of capital cases and review aggregate
data. Further, the court not only sought to provide a remedy to all pending
cases, but set up an institution designed to pursue ongoing structural
reform of its capital sentencing system.1 5
D. The Second and Tenth Circuits:
Partial and Failed Aggregation
Each of the prior case studies involved a different systemic
constitutional criminal procedure violation-fabrication of forensic
evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial discrimination. The
final case study, set in the Second Circuit, focuses less on the criminal
procedure problems involved (cursory appellate review) than on the
unsatisfying scope of the aggregation. I also include a case study not of
210. See In re Proportionality Review Project, 735 A.2d at 543-44; In re Proportionality Review
Project II, 757 A.2d at 226.
211. In re Proptionality Review Project, 735 A.2d at 533-34.
212. Id.
213. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently appointed a retired judge as Special Master in a new
aggregative review of consolidated cases in State v. Chun et al., 2006 WL 3858446 (N.J. ) (describing
updated stay procedures), to hear expert evidence regarding scientific reliability of "Alcotest 7110," an
infrared device New Jersey law enforcement adopted to replace the Breathalyzer. See Charles Toutant,
N.J. Supreme Court to Determine Reliability of DUI Testing Device, N.J. L.J., Dec. 19, 2005. Drunk
driving prosecutions were stayed pending rulings regarding allegations of erroneous readings; the
Court's ruling may "end the gridlock" concerning the device's scientific reliability. Id.
214. In re Proportionality Review Project 11, 757 A.2d at 172, 226.
215. This novel judicial scheme continues although the legislature has suspended the death penalty
in New Jersey citing fairness concerns. Act of Jan. 12, 2006, 2005 N.J. Laws ch. 321, § 3,
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/PL05/321_.PDF; Judiciary New Release,
Supreme Court Accepts Death Penalty Report, Oct. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/PRI01306a.pdf.
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aggregation, but of failure to aggregate by the Tenth Circuit, despite its
unique position to address persistent problems in the criminal system. The
Second Circuit's incomplete aggregation and the Tenth Circuit's failure to
aggregate provide contrasts regarding the value courts place on economy,
federalism, and individual rights.
An aggregation of habeas corpus petitions led to a unique and
controversial interchange between the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and
the Eastern District of New York. The Second Circuit consolidated sixteen
unrelated habeas corpus petitions on appeal, because they raised a common
issue of law. Each of the petitions was summarily dismissed without any
written explanation of the grounds by district court Judges David G. Trager
and Edward R. Korman. The circuit initially held that such dismissals were
impermissibly opaque and not "sufficiently informative to permit
meaningful appellate review. "216
Judge Trager wrote to the circuit and explained that he would deny a
petition summarily if it "clearly appear[ed] to have no merit," based on a
"thorough review," and would not write his reasons, but instead would cite
to the state appellate court's decision and prosecutor's papers.1 7
It was the Second Circuit that blinked. In an amended decision, the
circuit reversed course and held that individual issues involved in the
petitions warranted "particularized" attention such that its prior
consolidation served "no useful purpose. '"218 Upon individualized review,
the court found that additional specificity from the lower court was
required on remand in only in two of the sixteen cases, and held as to the
others that the petitioners did not show substantial deprivation of a
constitutional right.219
The back and forth between the Second Circuit and the Eastern
District of New York illustrates the ongoing judicial discomfort with
adopting aggregation in the criminal context. In undoing its former
consolidation of sixteen habeas corpus petitions, the circuit raised, but did
not develop, the questions of legitimacy and individualized justice that
arise when courts consolidate cases that appear to present common issues
of law. The Second Circuit seemed conflicted, desiring to avoid the
appearance of also engaging in summary justice, yet seeking to remedy
summary dismissals that imposed the cost of interpreting reasoning without
216. Rudenko v. Costello, 286 F.3d 51,64 (2d Cir. 2002).
217. Id. at 61 (The practice Judge Trager followed since Spring 1999 was to "personally review"
the record and "[i]f the case clearly appears to have no merit, I deny the petition summarily based upon
my own personal and thorough review of the relevant parts of the record. Normally, when I do so I rely
either on the opinion of the Appellate Division, if it contains a discussion of the relevant issue, or upon
the discussion contained in the memorandum of law filed by the District Attorney or both."). Judge
Trager added; "[W]hen I believe the case warrants it, I write a thorough, detailed opinion explaining
my reasons for denying the writ." Id.
218. Rudenko v. Costello, 322 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 2003).
219. See id.
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written guidance from the lower court on appellate courts. The decision
suggests that aggregative reform must look to costs imposed on the court
system as a whole.
An example from the Tenth Circuit illustrates the systemic cost of the
failure to aggregate. The Tenth Circuit faced a series of habeas corpus
appeals raising extreme prosecutorial misconduct by Oklahoma County
District Attorney Robert H. Macy (the prosecutor who repeatedly
introduced evidence that forensic criminologist Joyce Gilchrist fabricated)
in death penalty cases.2 ° In capital case after capital case, Macy uttered
litanies of prejudicial remarks to the jury, 221 mocked the defendant,
misstated the law and referred to evidence not in the record,222 introduced
surprise theories at trial,223 compared a defendant to Charles Manson,224 and
engaged in misconduct that was both "juvenile" and "intentional and
calculated." '225 One Tenth Circuit decision and one state court decision
reversed a conviction based on Macy's misconduct, but that did not solve
the problem.26 In case after case, the Tenth Circuit found "overwhelming
evidence" of guilt such that Macy's repeated misconduct was harmless
error. 2 7 Oklahoma appellate courts responded similarly; 28 however, one
judge despaired that "[t]his Court has let this flagrant disregard of our
rulings pass too long. ' 229 Tenth Circuit Judge Robert H. Henry in 2002
wrote separately in 2002 to "voice ... concern" with misconduct "over the
last fifteen years,' 23" and noting that "in spite of the absence of such
prejudice in individual cases, at some point the repeated violation of ethical
responsibility threatens the foundations of our justice system. ' 23'
The Tenth Circuit could have employed aggregation to deal with
repeated prosecutorial misconduct in a variety of ways. Aggregation in this
context might have meant ruling a presumption existed, based on a ruling
that Macy's behavior violated the constitution, but referring to the lower
courts the question whether individual relief should be granted. The Court
could have simply referred Macy to a state disciplinary committee
regarding the repeated instances of misconduct based on his pattern of
220. See supra notes 151-153.
221. See Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1166-67 (10th Cir.1999).
222. See Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013-24 (10th Cir. 2002).
223. See Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1296 (10th Cir. 2004).
224. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1999).
225. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
226. See Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999); McCarty v. Oklahoma, 765
P.2d 1215, 1221 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing a conviction and remanding for a new trial).
227. Le, 311 F.3d at 1019; Trice, 196 F.3d at 1067-68.
228. For state court cases similarly finding misconduct by Macy to be harmless error in light of
overwhelming evidence of guilt, see Hooks v. Oklahoma, 19 P.3d 294, 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001);
Duckett v. Oklahoma, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
229. Hooks, 19 P.3d at 314 n.51.
230. Le, 311 F.3d at 1029-30 (Henry, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 1030.
2007]
CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW
behavior. Short of aggregating cases, the court could have provided
declaratory relief, stating that Macy's behavior was unconstitutional,
though denying individual relief. Instead, the Tenth Circuit failed to
separate the issue of systemic misconduct from individual harmless error,
and thus permitted Macy and other prosecutors to "cynically test the
bounds of the harmless-error doctrine.2 32 As a result of its myopic failure to
view the problem as systemic, the public suffered fifteen years of
misconduct from Macy and his office.
Both the Tenth Circuit and (to a lesser degree) the Second Circuit
were unwilling to engage in a judicial self-help by consolidating cases on
appeal in order to review and remedy repeat error. In both cases,
aggregation on appeal raised no due process concerns. No potential
problems of nonparty preclusion discouraged aggregation; all affected
defendants were parties and all sought relief as against the State.
Nevertheless, the courts exhibited strong institutional reluctance to
aggregate, a reluctance grounded in an individualized, and I argue
misplaced, conception of the criminal process. In both cases, this
reluctance had significant systemic costs, in the form of either cursory
review or prosecutorial misconduct.
III
MODELS FOR AGGREGATION AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Justice Scalia, commenting in Herrera v. Collins on whether the
Constitution permits a court to execute an innocent person, stated that
"[w]ith any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face this embarrassing
question again," and added that the Court should therefore not saddle lower
courts with the need to examine "routine and even repetitive" questions
about prisoners' innocence.2 33 Aggregation in criminal law, adopted by
lower courts in unusual situations involving systemic criminal procedural
violations, suggests that courts face a fork in the road. Courts can aggregate
to summarily dispose of the routine and repetitive cases overloading their
criminal dockets without the full complement of due process protections
drawn from civil law that I frame below. Or they can instead develop ways
to ask "embarrassing" questions about criminal procedure violations or
even questions about prisoners' innocence, using aggregation to sort out
miscarriages of justice from the "routine and repetitive." Each of the state
courts discussed in Part II reacted against the routine and repetitive
individualized approach to criminal law, and instead used aggregation to
develop group solutions for criminal justice problems.
232. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
233. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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On the other hand, many courts, like the Second and Tenth Circuits,
may be understandably reluctant to experiment with novel aggregative
techniques, even when confronted with systemic error. Counsel may not
often seek aggregative solutions, not having considered such approaches.
Courts may shy away from aggregative approaches out of a reluctance to
intrude on law enforcement. Courts may also understandably fear the
uncharted terrain of aggregation in criminal law and the very real due
process dangers of binding entire groups of criminal defendants. The next
sections provide guidance in response to such important practical and
constitutional concerns. I develop a due process framework to address
when aggregative procedures may be used in criminal law. I argue that
lower courts should embrace this framework when they find aggregation in
criminal law appropriate. Further, I argue that based on this framework, the
Supreme Court should if given the opportunity recognize and approve the
aggregative innovations of lower courts as consistent with due process.
Finally, I turn to alternatives to aggregation, recognizing that if courts
remain hesitant to aggregate criminal cases regarding criminal procedure
rights, other forms of institutional reform might nevertheless accomplish
the goal of remedying systemic criminal procedure violations. Such
intermediate models avoid some of the procedural complications of
aggregation, but on the other hand, they also lack the benefits of formal
judicial enforcement, since they depend instead on informal self-regulation
within criminal justice institutions. The examples that I explore are
innocence commissions, prosecutorial review, special masters, and
substantive two-tier appellate review.
A. A Due Process Framework
At the outset of this Article, I described how an apparently rigid
divide between criminal and civil law suggests at first blush that little to no
aggregation is possible in criminal law. Based on the strength and
formality of the criminal law ideal of the individual day in court, one might
expect the rise of aggregation in criminal law to present thorny
constitutional questions. Instead, the examples discussed above show that
aggregation of criminal cases remains quite feasible. In the shadow of the
Supreme Court's decisions, lower courts adopted means of aggregating
claims that avoid constitutional right to jury trial concerns. I now provide a
framework for analyzing the procedural and constitutional implications of
the courts' approaches, which the lower court opinions did not explicitly
provide.
I argue that due process rules provide coherent and important
boundaries for aggregation in criminal law. Although the approaches
discussed in Part II did not overstep due process limits, the courts did not
explore why their methods avoided due process violations. Without an
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exploration of these reasons, courts might inappropriately extend their
models to threaten criminal procedure rights. Under my framework, courts
would monitor three critical areas where procedural protections
are necessary: (1) preclusion (often requiring bifurcation), (2) adequate
representation, and (3) exit rights.
1. Preclusion and Bifurcation
The state courts in each example of aggregation in criminal law
discussed in Part II employed a bifurcated structure in which courts limited
their decisions to common issues of procedural rights. This bifurcated
structure is the result of preclusion rules derived from civil due process
law. Such rules provide a due process protection against being bound by
litigation in which one was not a party (with class actions as a
notable exception). 234 Due process permits two types of preclusion of prior
parties: (1) claim preclusion, which prevents relitigation of transactionally
related claims, and (2) issue preclusion, which binds a party as to factual
and legal issues that the party previously litigated and lost. 235 Below, I
discuss how bifurcation prevents both types of preclusion from posing
significant due process hurdles to aggregation of criminal cases and
explore the potential benefits bifurcation offers defendants. I conclude by
examining the limits due process places on bifurcation.
Without bifurcated adjudication, claim preclusion might present an
obstacle to class actions in criminal law. Absent bifurcation, class actions
might unfairly prevent nonparticipants from raising their individual
criminal appeal claims. In Part I, I discussed how the federal habeas corpus
class action met its demise after the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashmus,
partly because the AEDPA's harsh successive petition rule would preclude
class members from bringing any subsequent habeas corpus petitions.
Criminal class actions are only possible under the Due Process Clause
when such harsh procedural roadblocks are relaxed to permit subsequent
individual claims to be brought.236 The West Virginia and Louisiana courts
employed bifurcation to avoid procedural hurdles to aggregation by ruling
on common questions only and subsequently allowing the separate
litigation of individual claims.237
234. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); supra note 42 and accompanying text
regarding class actions.
235. See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d. ed.
2002) (distinguishing issue and claim preclusion).
236. Civil class action requirements already ensure that only cases with common issues and those
in which class resolution is efficient will be litigated. Notice and an opportunity to opt-out also protect
the due process rights of those bound by the class action's holding. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2).
237. A court could avoid the problem of precluding claims of nonlitigants by ruling on each of the
cases individually, resulting in fewer economies but generating some through the use of a common
decision maker. See infra Part llI.B.3.
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Whether accomplished through class action or through consolidation,
bifurcated aggregation allows courts to achieve economies by deciding
only limited issues on a group basis. Aggregate rulings on common mixed
questions of law and fact simplify subsequent individual proceedings by
taking those common issues off the table. Such aggregate rulings avoid due
process problems because they do not bar petitioners from raising separate
questions in their individual cases afterwards. iFor example, a ruling that
the state adequately funded indigent defense would not prevent a prisoner
from later raising the issue that his lawyer performed inadequately in his
specific trial. The prisoner's trial would involve separate events and factual
issues, and the prisoner would not have previously litigated the claim
regarding his own trial.238
In contrast, reduced efficiencies arise from deciding a purely legal
issue because any decision in a "test case" would already be binding
precedent in future cases. Thus, when Kuwaiti relatives of twelve men
indefinitely detained at Guantanamo Bay filed a joint habeas petition
requesting access to courts to exonerate themselves, the consolidated
petition was appropriate since that legal question could be decided apart
from the individual facts of any of the cases; but even if only one detainee
had filed an action, the ruling in his case would be binding precedent on
that legal issue regardless.239 The courts described in Part II did not render
decisions striking down legal rules or statutes that then affected large
numbers of criminal cases, like the Supreme Court did in Furman v.
Georgia or Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 40 but instead ruled regarding existing
criminal procedure fights and, in particular, regarding mixed questions of
law and fact for which efficiencies were gained from consolidated
evidentiary hearings to illuminate the systemic nature of the violations. The
rulings resembled class actions brought by plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief regarding a pattern of violations.24'
Issue preclusion rules also explain how courts can consolidate
criminal cases and decide common mixed questions of law and fact
without raising substantial due process problems. Aggregate judgments did
not improperly preclude future prisoners on individual issues that they
never litigated. Instead, each decision related to criminal procedure fights
that criminal defendants could then affirmatively assert against the State, a
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The court's decision would,
however, have a stare decisis effect on any future claims challenging the adequacy of state funding for
indigent defense.
239. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (D.D.C. 2005).
240. As noted in supra note 68, the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), resulted in the overturning of hundreds of death sentences nationwide. Similarly, the Court's
decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 508 (2000), affected sentencing in thousands of
cases.
241. See infra Part ilI.D regarding whether court-centered aggregation may better remedy criminal
procedure violations than civil litigation.
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repeat player in all prosecutions. Defendants who do not participate in
aggregate litigation can still benefit from favorable decisions if they
successfully assert collateral estoppel against the State, extending the reach
of the aggregate decision. 42
When a court decides common issues against a class of prisoners,
preclusion rules ensure scant prejudice to those prisoners who did not
participate in the litigation. Even if a court decides that a group of criminal
defendants cannot reverse their convictions based on a crime lab's pattern
of forensic fraud, its ruling, while a precedent with stare decisis effect,
would not prevent future criminal defendants from raising a fabrication of
evidence claim. That a lab did not systematically fabricate evidence in the
past does not mean that it did not do so in an individual case or that it will
not systematically do so in the future. As is clear from the Supreme Court's
civil class action decisions, due process prevents a court from binding
future parties not yet injured or parties who did not have a full and fair
opportunity to participate in the prior litigation.243
Further, as noted earlier, the system-wide relief that courts granted in
their consolidated decisions, resembles the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or
declaratory relief class action. 2' This civil category recognizes that given a
homogenous class without conflicting interests, equitable relief on behalf
of a class does not adversely preclude class members.245 In West Virginia,
Connecticut and New Jersey, courts grouped cases together to consider
providing state-wide injunctive relief. Intuitively, defendants can only
benefit from such aggregation (provided that they have adequate
representation, as discussed in the next section).
The combination of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
constitutional right to a jury trial and due process preclusion rules narrows
the range of issues that aggregation can reach in criminal law. This
explains the structure of the aggregative schemes described in Part II. Only
affirmative rights of defendants, not questions of guilt or elements of the
crime, are appropriate for aggregation. Courts cannot prevent individual
defendants from asserting rights for which they were not represented in
aggregate litigation in subsequent individual cases. This explains why the
state courts bifurcated cases to separate individual questions from common
group questions of rights violation. Deciding individual defendants' claims
would have violated due process.
242. Regarding non-mutual offensive use of collateral estoppel, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Roles are reversed from civil litigation. The criminal defendant in effect
acts as a plaintiff asserting constitutional rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause also prevents the State
from precluding a defendant based on a prior criminal conviction. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20, 627 (1997).
244. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
245. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Criminal defendants therefore may have everything to gain and little
to lose from aggregation. However, due process rules mean that
aggregation is practicable only in a narrow but important issues-only or
bifurcated case. This type of case involves a pattern of violations in which
common factual and legal issues affect a group of criminal defendants.
2. Adequate Representation and Conflicts of Interest
Courts should engage in special scrutiny of the adequacy of
representation in aggregated criminal cases, where common and severe
problems of underfunded or inexperienced indigent defense counsel may
only be magnified. At the same time, aggregation also has the potential to
greatly improve the quality of indigent representation for large groups of
defendants. The rules for adequate representation in civil class actions
provide courts with a good starting point for this examination.
Inadequate representation is the paramount threat to due process in
criminal law aggregation. The stakes for criminal defendants, who face loss
of liberty, reputation, and even life, cannot be overstated, even as to
criminal procedure rights separate from ultimate questions of guilt or
innocence. Despite these high stakes, local governments often provide, and
the Supreme Court finds constitutionally adequate, trial counsel who are
inexperienced and poorly trained or worse-indifferent, half-asleep or
drunk during trial.246 Such lawyers are barely often compensated for their
work, and studies show gross inadequacies in indigent defense funding in
many states.247 In some statewide or county-wide funding schemes counsel
receive fixed fees that amount to sub-minimum wages even in capital
cases,248 or fixed-price contracts for an entire county's annual caseload. 49
The fact that adequacy of representation is not examined by courts in the
vast majority of cases plea bargained in the shadow of trial only
adds to the problem.250 Aggregation could magnify the harm of inadequate
representation in criminal cases.
Aggregation also poses less immediately obvious threats to adequate
representation. At first glance, criminal cases do not present self-serving
lawyers with any opportunities to strike the "sweetheart" settlement
246. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor. The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994) (describing examples of egregiously poor
representation that the Supreme Court approved as constitutionally adequate).
247. See supra note 96.
248. See id.; see also Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-
Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281, 300-02 (1991).
249. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery
of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 307 (2002) ("The greatest problems with
inadequate defense counsel are created by low-bid fixed-price contracts.").
250. See Adam Liptak, County Says It's Too Poor to Defend the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003,
at A I (describing dire reports of indigent defense counsel coercing clients into pleading guilty simply
to reduce their overwhelming caseloads).
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agreements at the expense of class members that plague civil law class
actions.2"' After all, criminal defendants look forward to no economic
reward, and counsel do not have any financial stake in the outcome
of criminal trials. 252 Nevertheless, the peculiar economics of criminal
litigation could result in sweetheart deals of a different breed. Public
defenders, prosecutors and judges all have potential motivations to favor
settlement at the expense of defendants.
Defense counsel are often under-funded and inexperienced. They may
be interested not in winning but only in receiving fixed compensation.
They may be unable to competently represent the rights of a group of
criminal appellants with respect to specialized procedural or expert
scientific issues. Aggregation may further reduce their already reduced
incentives to present individualized cases in an overburdened system. If
defense lawyers receive higher fees for representing groups, they may
pursue aggregation in cases not similarly situated or where conflicts of
interest exist. Defense counsel may gear resources toward cases they feel
have merit at the expense of aggregated cases--one extreme example was
a public defender's office in Nevada that assigned least experienced
attorneys to capital cases as a matter of policy, and allocated fewer
resources to cases where their client failed a polygraph test.253 Roberto
Miranda, who spent fourteen years on death row until his conviction was
vacated based on ineffective assistance of counsel,254 received a defender
who was one year out of law school, never tried a murder case, and
interviewed just three of the forty witnesses Miranda told him could prove
his innocence.255 The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc concluded that Miranda
could sue the County for policies that, as alleged, all but guaranteed him
ineffective assistance. 256 Finally, public defenders are difficult to hold
liable for malpractice.257
251. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 1377-78 (discussing collusion in civil class action
settlements); see also sources cited in supra note 44.
252. When groups of ciminal defendants or appellants are differently situated, courts could adopt
the remedy suggested by the Court in Ortiz and Amchem of dividing subclasses with separate counsel.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Amehem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 627 (1997).
253. Id.
254. Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 467-68 (9th Cir. 2003). See Garrett, Federal
Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 78-79.
255. Miranda, 319 F.3d at 467.
256. Id. at 470.
257. See Howard H. Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective Response to the
Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783, 810 (1996) (criticizing rulings finding public defenders
immune and describing difficult common law standard requiring a showing of prejudice caused by
attorney's breach of duty).
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Prosecutors might use aggregation to dispose of cases favorably, or to
obtain a "sweetheart" ruling on a criminal procedure issue.258 Collusive
settlement with group-counsel in an aggregate litigation could save the
State the burden of relitigating difficult procedural issues in individual
cases with more defendant-friendly facts. Indeed, one could imagine a
scenario in which the State agrees to withdraw prosecution of a named
criminal defendant class-representative in order to secure a beneficial
settlement regarding future challenges to criminal procedure violations.
Collusive settlements in which the court approves a mass plea bargain
to avoid individual criminal trials or appeals would be possible. In civil
law, "trial judges have a personal and professional stake in settling large
class actions," and judges have approved vast settlements where underlying
liability remained in doubt.259 Similarly, judges in criminal cases might
conduct lax scrutiny of defense counsel and then push group plea bargains
just as courts may encourage settlement of complex civil suits.26 Indeed,
the ABA has documented examples in several states where courts make a
regular practice of unconstitutionally pressuring indigent defendants to
accept plea bargains, sometimes in groups, without having even met
defense counsel.26' Given our perennially overburdened criminal system in
which repeat players seek to clear their overloaded dockets, courts may be
irresistibly tempted to use aggregation to dispose of cases quickly.
On the other hand, aggregation may greatly improve indigent criminal
defense representation. As in civil class actions involving similar small
claims of numerous plaintiffs, criminal defendants may share common
allegations of criminal procedure violations that no one criminal defendant
would have a great chance of prevailing on. Absent aggregation, a defense
attorney might not bother to raise a challenge that is unlikely to impact the
outcome in his defendant's case. As a group, however, a pattern of possible
constitutional violations may suggest the need for a system-wide
injunction. For example, in West Virginia aggregation lead to crucial
reforms of the state crime laboratory, but only a handful of criminal
convictions were reversed.
As in civil cases, far better lawyers might be attracted to aggregate
litigation. Criminal defense lawyers might receive additional funding to
represent groups in more complex aggregate litigation. If defense attorneys
are paid by the case, they might have great incentives to aggregate cases
258. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products,
Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (describing collusive settlement in mass asbestos litigation).
259. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1301 (2002) (describing approval of class settlement in breast implant litigation leading to
Dow Coming bankruptcy in which scientific support for claims remained equivocal).
260. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (class
certification may "encourage settlement of the litigation").
261. See ABA REPORT, supra note 96, at 24-25.
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and seek out common issues affecting groups of criminal defendants, just
as fee shifting rewards a civil rights attorney as a "private attorney general"
uncovering public wrongs. 62 Courts might provide funding to compensate
defense lawyers for the more difficult work of representing a group, which
might attract more skilled lawyers.2 63 Large law firms and civil rights
organizations might volunteer to handle aggregated cases raising systemic
issues.2"
What is more, group representation would provide some post-
conviction indigent appellants, who often have no lawyers at all, with
counsel. Except for indigent capital prisoners who have a statutory right to
counsel for federal habeas corpus petitions,2 65 appellants have no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during post-conviction appeals. Only a "very
small fraction" of federal habeas corpus petitioners are represented.266
While I suggest that courts should take advantage of the benefits of
appointing competent counsel with better resources to handle systemic
problems, I also note that courts should be aware that aggregation is
double-edged in criminal law with respect to the dangers of inadequate
defense representation. Courts should provide heightened scrutiny of
adequacy when aggregating criminal cases, just as they do in civil cases.267
In the context of civil aggregation, the Supreme Court has made clear that
due process requires that a non-party class member be "adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party" for the
class member to be bound by the litigation.268
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4-5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5909-10 (explaining the Senate's intent to shift fees to reward civil rights lawyers acting
as a "private attorney general").
263. For a fascinating article conceptualizing civil defendant class actions, and suggesting
schemes to reward counsel for representing groups of dispersed defendants, see Assaf Hamdani & Alon
Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685 (2005).
264. An example was the role of Paul Weiss in the Earl Washington, Jr. case, discussed in supra
Part I.D. I. Public interest organizations such as the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund also
coordinate pro bono efforts to remedy systemic criminal justice violations.
265. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854-55 (1994).
266. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 191 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he vast majority of
federal habeas petitions are brought without legal representation."); In re Habeas Corpus Cases, No.
03-MISC-66 (JBW), 2003 WL 21919833, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2003); ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY
W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 14 (1995), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf
(finding that 93% of habeas petitioners in study were pro se). See also Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F.
Supp. 530, 532 (M.D. Fla. 1967). A Florida federal district court, before certifying a class, ordered
interviews with death row inmates to determine whether they would be adequately represented by class
counsel. See Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389 where the court concluded that a class action was
appropriate because the petitioners were "functionally illiterate and practically counselless."
267. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (noting that a Title VI
class action may only be certified "if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied").
268. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42
(194), and FED. R. Civ. P. 23); see also Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and
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Thus far, courts have notconsidered adequacy of representation issues
regarding aggregation in criminal law (except for a time in habeas corpus
class actions). 269 Although the rules regarding adequate representation in
criminal law aggregation are murky where post-conviction appellants lack
a right to counsel, the higher stakes in aggregated criminal cases provide a
powerful reason to scrutinize adequacy of representation. The Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide one model for enhanced scrutiny of
adequacy of representation in criminal law. The Rules require federal
district courts to appoint counsel for habeas corpus petitioners when "the
interests of justice so require,' '27" and "if necessary for effective discovery,"
and when "an evidentiary hearing is warranted."27' Similarly, federal courts
provide resources "necessary for adequate representation" to petitioners in
cases requiring support services, expert assistance or testimony, statistical
analysis, or investigation.272 Federal courts should thus appoint counsel in
aggregate cases involving complex legal and scientific issues affecting
groups, which are likely to necessitate evidentiary hearings.
If courts aggregate they may attract better compensated counsel to
deal with issues affecting groups, but together with those substantial
benefits comes the danger of exacerbating endemic shoddy and under-
funded indigent representation.2 73 The heightened stakes in criminal cases
suggest that due process requires far more careful scrutiny of adequacy of
representation in criminal aggregate litigation than in civil aggregate
litigation.
3. Exit Rights
Although exit rights provide a central protection in civil law against
the dangers of being bound by an aggregate judgment without participation
or consent, 274 none of the five case studies discussed provided any exit
rights. Did each court violate due process?
Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) (reconsidering the theoretical grounding for non-
party preclusion, including in aggregate litigation).
269. See supra note 124. In its most macabre ruling regarding the adequacy of a class
representative, the Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of the lead plaintiff in a class action
challenging electrocution as cruel and unusual. After the lead plaintiffs execution, the action was
dismissed. See Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 932 (1993).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2) (2000).
271. Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rules 6(a), 8(c).
272. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (2000); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 60, at § 19.3 (collecting
cases regarding financial assistance). Regarding financial assistance in capital cases, see 28 U.S.C. §
848(q)(9) (2000).
273. On the other hand, if a court merely consolidates cases before a decision maker who
considers cases individually, the parties have a difficult argument that they should receive counsel
when they otherwise have no right to counsel. Complexity of cases may sometimes call for
discretionary appointment of counsel.
274. See George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice And Opt Out At The Settlement Stage
Of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 264-67 (1996); supra notes 38-39.
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In civil law, as noted, the Supreme Court and the Federal Rules
require an exit right in "voluntary" class actions, to prevent a party from
being adversely precluded without an individual hearing,275 but Rule 23(b)
also permits "mandatory" class actions without such notice and opt-out, for
example, when a homogenous class seeks injunctive relief.276
One explanation why courts did not provide exit rights in the cases
discussed in Part II is that the situations in which they consolidated cases
resemble the "mandatory" situations under which Rule 23(b) permits a
court to aggregate without notice and an opportunity to opt out. The relief
anticipated in several of the cases discussed was often injunctive or
declaratory and would, as a practical matter, bind all prisoners in the group.
Where decisions regarding common issues did not preclude individual
prisoners from later pursuing individual issues in their own cases, there
was no need to supply a right to exit.
However, an exit right should be required if a court enters an
aggregate criminal law decision that touches on individual issues.
Defendants might sometimes be willing to maintain a group action even if
it means agreeing to preclude the possibility of a future appeal on a
particular issue.
The nature of the day in court provided by the decision-making body
conducting aggregation may also alter the due process calculus, and
illuminates the need for an exit right even where defendants would not be
bound in their individual cases. While courts retain considerable discretion
to consolidate and manage their caseloads as they see fit, if a specialized
decision maker provides an unduly limited day in court, aggregation may
violate due process. For example, if a court groups cases before a non-
judge, due process might require an exit right.2 77 Similarly, exit may be
required if a decision maker aggregated cases without opportunity for a
hearing or written decisions in cases deserving them.
Even if courts permit exit, it may have no practical effect. On appeal,
a decision as to one case may effectively be a decision as to all as a matter
of precedent. Further, criminal defendants may not have adequate counsel
to advise them about exit rights. For that reason, adequate representation
rights may be a far more critical due process safeguard. I turn now from the
procedural dangers of aggregation to several alternatives to aggregation.
275. Id.
276. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
277. In civil cases, parties must consent to appointment of a non-Article III special master. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a), (b). On the other hand, a federal magistrate judge may rule on habeas petitions
subject to de novo review by the district judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) (2000); Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases, Rule 8(b)(l), 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254.
[Vol. 95:383
A GGREGA TION IN CRIMINAL LA W
B. Models for Institutional Reform
Additional models which rely on institutional reforms-not
aggregation-are less encumbered by the due process limitations just
described because they do not procedurally aggregate. I have discussed
how courts experimented with aggregative innovations to develop systemic
remedies for recurring criminal procedure problems. Nevertheless, due
process limits the range of situations in which courts can provide aggregate
remedies, such as situations in which there is a pattem of criminal
procedure rights violations. Rather than impose systemic reform from the
outside, another approach would encourage institutional self-reform,
perhaps also for systemic problems not rising to the level of constitutional
violations. Models for an intermediate approach include innocence
commissions, prosecutorial review of wrongful convictions, appointment
of a special master to review a district court's habeas corpus petitions, and
a two-tiered system of appeal. Such models show the range of techniques
that courts could use to not only remedy systemic problems in the
administration of criminal justice, but also to collaborate with other repeat
player criminal justice actors. Extending systemic approaches beyond
procedural aggregation may help to prevent error in the first instance. On
the other hand, intermediate institutional models lack advantages of
aggregation, particularly a court's grant of formal relief vindicating
constitutional rights.
1. Innocence Commissions
One model for institutional reform is for courts to create new
independent interdisciplinary institutions resembling administrative
agencies. Such agencies would review serious miscarriages of justice,
make systemic conclusions and derive possible reforms. In several states,
courts or legislatures have created such institutions in response to
erroneous convictions uncovered through DNA testing-innocence
commissions-tasked with the job of reviewing criminal cases and
investigating those that raise indicia of innocence. Other state courts and
legislatures are considering establishing such commissions.27
One reason states have stepped outside of existing courts of appeals is
that courts remain unreceptive to claims of innocence, which face
substantial obstacles, such as time limitations, resistance to post-conviction
278. See The Innocence Project, Innocence Commissions in the United States,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/415.php (describing creation of innocence commissions in
the states, including the most recent commission created in Pennsylvania); Editorial, The True State of
C.S.. Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007 (noting that half a dozen states are currently considering
creating innocence commissions). The Illinois Governor established a temporary commission on capital
punishment that presented a series of groundbreaking recommendations subsequently adopted by the
legislature. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNORS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
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DNA testing, and often the lack of any "writ of innocence" that a petitioner
can bring post-conviction. 279 Nor has the Supreme Court defined the
burden to present (in a capital case only) a federal constitutional claim of
"actual innocence," but the Court did predict it would be an
"extraordinarily high" burden due to the disruptive effects such claims
would have on "the need for finality in capital cases."28
The first such commission, the North Carolina Actual
Innocence Commission, established by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, 281 was created in the wake of several high profile
DNA exonerations.282 North Carolina's Supreme Court decided that a
permanent interdisciplinary study commission was needed, but
independent of the judiciary and with interdisciplinary participation of
law enforcement, defense attorneys, social scientists and judges.283 Initially,
the Commission developed standards for videotaping police
interrogations.284 It promulgated standards recommending sequential and
double blind eyewitness identification procedures,285 which were adopted
279. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNORS COMMISSION, supra note 278, at 52; Kathy Swedlow, Don't
Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern "Postconviction " DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL.
W. L. REV. 355, 356-87 (2002) (reviewing state statutes permitting post-conviction DNA testing and
relief, and arguing that most have a series of limitations that restrict relief). Executive clemency also
exists to remedy injustices at the discretion of the state executive. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v.
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 282-86 (1998). Such power, however, often has not been exercised by
governors even in cases involving DNA evidence of innocence. See, e.g., Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in
Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49
VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996) (describing decline in use of commutation, political pressures to avoid
clemency, and efforts by legislatures to abolish or limit clemency).
280. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-17 (1995) (stating that a remedy would only exist if the
evidence is so strong as to make the sentence "constitutionally intolerable"); Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
281. See Innocence Project, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission-
Mission Statement, Objectives, and Procedures, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
NC InnocenceCommissionMission.html (setting forth Commission's mission statement and
procedures).
282. See Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon
Perspectives Joined By a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 648 (2004) ("Because of the recent
number of irrefutable DNA exonerations, a common ground now exists on which law enforcement,
prosecution, and defense can stand together and agree that if there are ways to decrease the possibility
of a wrongful conviction without risking conviction of the guilty, they should be pursued.").
283. The North Carolina Commission's thirty-one members include "the Chief Justice as
chairman, an executive director, the State Attorney General, the Director of the State Bureau of
Investigation, the Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety, an associate supreme court justice,
superior court judges, legislative representatives, prosecutors, sheriffs, police chiefs, deputies in law
enforcement, defense attorneys, victim advocates, law professors, and private attorneys." Id. at 651.
284. See Matthew Eisley, Better ID Sought in Criminal Inquiries, NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 13,
2003, at BI ("The commission's next task will be to develop standards for videotaping police
interrogations.").
285. See Innocence Project, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission,
Recommendations For Eyewitness Identification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/
NCInnocenceCommissionldentification.html.
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to train all North Carolina law enforcement officers. 286 Thus, the
Commission initially took on a primarily policymaking and rule-making
role.
Legislation then broadened the Commission to resemble even more an
intermediate form of judicial aggregation. A new law created a
supplementary North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, with an
eight-member panel that reviews criminal post-conviction cases raising
indicia of innocence.287 Panel members serve three-year terms and include
a superior court judge, prosecutor, criminal defense lawyer, sheriff,
victim's advocate, and members of the public. 288 A Director of the
Commission assists in developing rules and standards for cases accepted
for review and coordinates investigations.289 If five panel members agree
that a defendant deserves judicial review, the Chief Justice appoints a three
judge panel. 9 ' That three judge panel may then overturn the conviction if
they unanimously agree the defendant showed "clear and convincing
evidence" of factual innocence.29" ' Thus, the state established a novel new
interdisciplinary entity to conduct post-conviction review of potential
innocence cases.
That inquiry commission model resembles similar bodies created in
the United Kingdom and Canada. The United Kingdom, in 1997, created a
Criminal Cases Revision Commission to serve as an independent executive
agency with full subpoena power to review convictions. It can not reverse
convictions, but refers cases to appellate courts.2 92 Similarly, in Canada a
person can request that the Minister of Justice convene a Criminal
Conviction Review Group (made up of attorneys from the Department of
Justice) to examine cases and make recommendations to the Minister. The
Minister can then order a new trial, hearing, or refer a case to a court.293
286. See Marvin Zalman, Cautionary Notes on Commission Recommendations: A Public Policy
Approach to Wrongful Convictions, 41 No.2 CRIM. LAW. BULL. 5, n.107 (2005).
287. See Andrea Weigl, Easley Signs Law Creating Innocence Panel, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 4,
2006, at B5; Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Easley Signs Innocence Inquiry Commission
Bill (Aug. 3, 2006), http://www.governor.state.nc.us/NewsFullStory.asp?is=3226; see also H.B. 1323,
2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005); S.B. 1045, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005);
Mumma, supra note 282, at 654. Interestingly, the Commission may not review claims of factual
innocence "if the convicted person is deceased." See H.B. 1323 at § 15A-1467(a).
288. See H.B. 1323 § 15A-1467(a), 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
289. H.B. 1323 at § 15A-1465.
290. Id. at § 15A-1468(c).
291. Id. at § 15A-1469(h). The panel's ruling is non-reviewable, but nor does its review
"adversely affect" rights to other post-conviction relief. Id. at § 15A- 1470(b).
292. See Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2001); see also David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An
Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 91 (2000).
293. Kathryn Campbell, Policy Responses to Wrongful Convictions in Canada, 41 No.2 CRIM.
LAW BULLETIN 4 (2005).
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Purely advisory commissions are perhaps less effective. For example,
a new Connecticut Commission on Wrongful Convictions has an advisory
role, though it was created with broad, interdisciplinary, bipartisan and
high-level participation of state figures such as the Chief State's Attorney,
the Bar Association, law schools, law enforcement and legislators.2 94
Independent institutions outside the court system could provide
benefits of administrative agencies-expertise, outside perspective, and
efficiency. In addition to providing an independent forum to investigate
post-conviction, such institutions can engage in systemic review. By
gathering information about disposition of criminal cases and appeals, and
data regarding the sources of error and unfairness, such Commissions can
recommend or implement system-wide reforms. 295 Federal institutions
could take on a similar role.296
294. See Advice of Counsel, 8/9/2004 CONN. L. TRIB. 21 ("The membership of the commission is
bipartisan and broad, including the Chief State's Attorney, the Chief Public Defender, the Victim
Advocate, representatives of the Connecticut Police Chiefs Association, the Bar Association, law
schools in the state, and universities in the state with undergraduate programs in criminal justice and
forensic science."). Connecticut's advisory commission has investigatory powers, including subpoena
power and access to police and prosecutor's records, and it reports to the joint standing committee of
the General Assembly on the judiciary suggested reforms to prevent wrongful convictions, conclusions
in investigations of convictions or recommendations following investigations as to the causes of a
wrongful conviction. 2003 Conn. Pub. Act No. 03-242 § 8. Similarly, a Wisconsin Criminal Justice
Study Commission similarly includes diverse government and private individuals gathered to
recommend criminal procedure reforms. Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission, Charter
Statement, http://www.law.wisc.edu/webshare/02i0/comnissioncharterstatement.pdf (listing
commission participants such as the State Bar of Wisconsin, Marquette University Law School, the
Wisconsin Attorney General's Office, and the University of Wisconsin Law School). The California
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice was created by the state Senate in 2004, with
members representing leading actors in the state criminal justice system, and it has issued tentative
recommendations on eyewitness identifications, false confessions and use of jailhouse informants,
which will ultimately be presented to the Governor. See http://www.ccfaj.org/charge.html. The
Governor of Texas recently created a Criminal Justice Advisory Council, but it currently lacks
subpoena power to investigate cases. See Press Release, Gov. Perry Announces Creation of Criminal
Justice Advisory Council, (Mar. 14, 2005), available at http://www.govemor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/
pressreleases/PressRelease.2005-03-14.3742/view.
The Virginia Innocence Commission is an even weaker model. Because it was created as a private
policy group and not by government, its recommendations may tend not to be accepted. The Innocence
Commission for Virginia (ICVA) has an advisory board that includes "former prosecutors and defense
counsel, notable public officials, and members of law enforcement and public interest groups."
Innocence Commission for Virginia Homepage, http://www.icva.us. Its first report, "A Vision for
Justice," released March 30, 2005, analyzed causes of eleven wrongful convictions in the state and
proposes reforms in areas including eyewitness identifications, interrogation, discovery, law
enforcement investigation, scientific evidence, and defense practices. Id. (follow "The ICVA Report"
hyperlink). In the past, however, "reforms recommended by study commissions, which are mainstream,
sensible, and bipartisan, seem to be ignored." Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the
Formation of "Innocence Commissions " in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 104 n.24 (2002).
295. See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 294, at 104-05.
296. The Justice For All Act creates a National Forensic Science Commission charged with
collecting data on best practices, promulgating standards in forensic testing, and providing research
grants. The Act also provides funding for capital defense and for postconviction access to DNA testing.
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 stat. 2260. The U.S. Justice Department could
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Innocence commissions can also accomplish one of the same goals as
the courts I discussed which conducted aggregation in criminal law-to
pool system-wide information about causes of error and use review of
wrongful convictions as an opportunity to consider reform. Despite the
power of new information technology, in our balkanized system, many
courts lack a systemic picture of issues such as error rates, delays, claims
raised on appeal, disposition, costs, sentencing, decisions to prosecute, and
jury pools.297 But use of statistics by the New Jersey and Connecticut
Supreme Courts suggests far more sophisticated analysis of error in our
criminal justice system. As noted, the DNA revolution has created a rich
body of data, which could be used by courts, law enforcement, and also
innocence commissions to refine review of criminal convictions,
and consider procedures to avoid wrongful convictions. 298 Innocence
Commissions reviewing data have already begun to recommend reform in
areas implicated by wrongful convictions: double-blind and sequential
lineups; videotaping confessions; auditing forensic crime laboratories; and
open file policies by prosecutors, all fairly inexpensive and practicable
remedies.2 99
"Inquiry" commissions do not use procedural aggregation to join
cases together and develop systematic solutions. Instead, without joinder,
they attempt to study systemic problems as they review individual cases.
They could do so within the courts, using techniques described in Part II,
but also by setting up independent commissions to review individual cases
and examine errors that cause wrongful convictions. Indeed, specialized
institutions could very well be captured, or simply lack the resources or
will to address systemic problems that arise. As described, most efforts
have been advisory and unsurprisingly ineffectual. If actually invested with
resources and power, however, such self-regulation could provide an
intermediate way to remedy systemic criminal justice problems.
also provide oversight, given its power under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to obtain relief to eliminate a wide
range of police misconduct-any "pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers" that
deprives persons of federal rights. 42 U.S.C. §§14141(a) (2000). The Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice presently investigates excessive force, false arrests, harassment, retaliation and
racial profiling, but not wrongful convictions. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Right Division, Special
Litigation Section, Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/police.htm.
297. For example, despite a rise in Sentencing Information Systems, "[n]o modem structured
sentencing system provides easily accessible data describing individual sentences or dynamic
sentencing patterns and practices." Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for
Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2005).
298. See supra notes 97-108.
299. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 76-79.
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2. Prosecutorial Case Review
Moving away from appellate courts and court-created review
commissions to self-regulation by other actors in the criminal system could
further expand the focus on systemic remedies, though also without the
accountability that courts provide when they aggregate cases. Self-
regulation by prosecutors could have a great impact, because they may be
the most powerful repeat players in the criminal system; the ability of
reform to reduce error and shape the system in the future depends
intimately on the role of prosecutors. In a second type of intermediate
approach, prosecutors could conduct internal review of cases to try to
detect and remedy systemic problems.
Prosecutors already group unrelated cases using a "de facto
administrative system" in which, based on the nature of resource
allocation, criminal law and sentencing guidelines, prosecutors in effect
set sentences during plea bargaining.3 0 The process that most criminal
defendants receive is not constitutional procedure, but rather internal
review of discretion within prosecutorial agencies. Prosecutors could
inform that process by conducting routine audits and review following
miscarriages such as wrongful convictions. Such a role does not aggregate,
and therefore does not impose a systemic remedy binding in all cases, but
rather uses informal techniques to examine groups of troubling cases.
The roles of prosecutors continue to change in response to error, and
expanding the model, prosecutors could develop procedures to prevent
errors before they happen. In several recent examples, prosecutors adopted
an institutional interest in preventing egregious error in the criminal justice
system. Prosecutors spearheaded a series of reforms adopted in Boston in
response to several high profile exonerations, including reform
of eyewitness identification procedures.3 1 In one high profile example,
prosecutors led efforts to review and sought dismissal of almost one
hundred convictions in the Ramparts Division police corruption scandal in
Los Angeles.30 2 Prosecutors were intimately involved in the West Virginia
consolidation and North Carolina innocence project discussed.
Though informal, such efforts could evolve into formal administrative
review by prosecutors geared toward preventing error. In turn such errors
detected could lead to adoption of open-file policies or change in criminal
300. Lynch, supra note 72, at 2142.
301. Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 87-88.
302. See, e.g., Beth Barrett & Greg Gittrich, Attorneys Confront D.A.; Flurries Of Defense
Motions Fly In Attempt To Open Files On Rogue Cop, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2000 (noting that
Superior Court Judge Larry Fidley dismissed sixty convictions at the request of the District Attorney's
office based on an investigation carried out by its task force); Rick Orlov, Truth of 234 More Cases in
Question, DAILY NEWS, May 5, 2000 (describing District Attorney's task force review of which
convictions should be dismissed).
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investigation procedures." 3 The result could parallel the work of innocence
commissions in continually evaluating causes of error and developing
procedural remedies. I note also that law enforcement and public defenders
could similarly adopt procedures designed to detect systemic problems and
suggest remedies.3"
Again, the benefit of procedural aggregation by courts remains that
courts formally remedy patterns of constitutional violations, enjoining all
actors with a judgment binding on an entire group of cases. Relying on
more informal self-regulation without any mechanism to ensure
accountability may not always provide as effective relief, even where
actors are willing to self-regulate. Nevertheless, should self-regulation be
adopted more widely, actors could prevent patterns of error from ever
occurring in the first place and avoiding the need for more intrusive
procedural aggregation by courts.
3. Judge Weinstein's Special Master
Federal district court Judge Jack B. Weinstein appointed a special
master to handle federal habeas corpus petitions, but unlike courts
discussed in Part II, he did not procedurally aggregate. Instead, he adopted
self-regulation by a court. He assigned habeas corpus petitions to a single
decision maker who considered each petition individually, avoiding
procedural difficulties of aggregation, while achieving some of the same
benefits.
At the suggestion of Judge Weinstein, the Eastern District of New
York applied to its backlog of almost five hundred habeas corpus petitions,
including petitions that had been awaiting disposition for six years, the
same aggregative and consolidating techniques that Judge Weinstein
pioneered in civil procedure.30 5 To resolve that backlog in a "fair and
expeditious" manner, Marc Falkoff was appointed Habeas Corpus Special
Master for the Eastern District of New York from 2003-2004.306
Never before had federal courts consolidated habeas corpus petitions
before a special master. The approach intended to achieve many of the
efficiencies of a class action but without formal joinder of claims. Martha
Minow describes Judge Weinstein's class action innovations as creation in
effect of "temporary administrative agencies. 30 7 Judge Weinstein's special
303. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 75, 87-88.
304. I have elsewhere described how in response to wrongful convictions, police departments have
adopted new procedures aimed at reducing errors in the areas of forensic science, eyewitness
identifications and confessions. See supra note 107.
305. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997).
306. In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d 303, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
307. See Minow, supra note 305, at 2010.
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master project suggests creation of such "temporary administrative
agencies" post-conviction.
The consolidated disposition of the petitions remained transparent;
Special Master Falkoff reported to Judge Weinstein, who ruled on each,3"8
and periodically then reported to the chief judge of the District.3"9 All cases
except three dozen that were reported were resolved through unpublished
written decisions."' Judge Weinstein also reported on the data set from the
consolidated review: in nine cases, 2% of petitions, the writ was granted
with release or a new trial ordered; 380 were dismissed as lacking in
sufficient merit, forty-two as time-barred, three as successive, and forty-
four were closed for failure to exhaust or as unripe.3 '
The reasons cited for this novel approach are illuminating. Judge
Weinstein emphasized reduced delays to the petitioner and also a concern
with adequate representation, stating, "[s]ince there is no constitutional
requirement for representation by counsel in post-appeal state or federal
collateral attacks, it is the poor who find themselves unable to find counsel
to help expedite decision, and it is the poor who are most disadvantaged by
our court's delays."3 2 Judge Weinstein also noted delay costs imposed on
the state system, and comity, especially due to exhaustion requirements of
the AEDPA 13 Weinstein's reasoning reflects those justifying aggregation
in civil class actions: efficiency, avoiding delay and enhanced
representation. A prominent reason was judicial economy, given a "heavily
overloaded court. 31 4
Judge Weinstein's innovations, while not aggregating petitions, but
rather still considering each one individually, nevertheless point to a range
of techniques that could revolutionize the way habeas corpus petitions are
reviewed.1 5 While Judge Weinstein's approach sought primarily to achieve
judicial economies, one could imagine a court taking the next step to
308. In the first six weeks, seventy-three cases "were disposed of," with a petition granted in one
case. See Cerisse Anderson, Murder Conviction Overturned on Jury Charge, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 2004.
309. See In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 307. Judge Weinstein noted that a "substantial number" of cases deserved careful
review, and "were quite close but were denied due to the highly deferential standards of review
imposed by statute and case law." Id.
312. Id. a 312.
313. Id.
314. Id. at304.
315. Connecticut may adopt such a model systemwide along the lines of Judge
Weinstein's innovations. Its Law Reform Commission has proposed a sweeping reform in which all
state habeas petitions would be consolidated in one judicial district, with expedited procedures
to sort cases and assign counsel before they are filed. See DAVID L. HEMOND, CONNECTICUT
LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, COMMITTEE REPORT ON HABEAS CORPUS (2001),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/Habeas%20Corpus/HabeasRptToCommission.htm. Interestingly both the
State Attorney General's Office and Public Defenders Office approved the proposal. Id. The reforms
have not been enacted to date.
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aggregate petitions and decide common substantive or procedural issues in
order to detect and remedy systemic errors. Or rather than aggregate, a
court could merely assign cases before a particular judge or magistrate or
special master, who nevertheless could screen and sort habeas petitions
based on common issues or perceived merit. This would achieve some of
the economies and benefits of aggregation while maintaining an
individualized approach to each case.316 Such a model leads toward a two-
tiered model discussed next.
4. Two-Tiered Criminal Review
Decades ago, Judge Henry Friendly posed the deep and also
inflammatory question: "[i]s innocence irrelevant" to our system of post-
conviction review?3"7 Why are petitioners not able to make the claim on
appeal that they are actually innocent-and taking it a step further, should
petitioners be required to assert a "colorable claim of innocence"?318 As a
moderated version of Judge Friendly's proposal, Joseph Hoffman and
William Stuntz (before the AEDPA) proposed a "two-tracked" system,31 9
in which "petitioners who can demonstrate a reasonable probability of
innocence would receive de novo review of their federal claims."32 Neither
Congress nor courts have adopted such invitations.32'
Nevertheless, courts could institute something like an innocence
commission: permitting "first tier" review of substantive claims based on
predictable causes of wrongful convictions, while relegating other cases to
the same "second tier" review they now receive. Courts could group
together cases by issue and assign cases raising a reasonable indicia of
innocence to a special master. Moreover, without changing the U.S. Code,
the courts could simply exercise their inherent authority to consolidate
cases, just as Judge Weinstein and state supreme courts did.
Courts conducting such appellate review could look for common
issues that could be aggregated, and provide a forum for procedural
316. In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 317. Judge Weinstein did not recommend
future "specialization in habeas cases by any one magistrate judge," but instead that a randomly
selected half of petitions be consolidated before a "specific magistrate." Id. Judge Weinstein also
proposed milder reforms: procedures for the Clerk's office to expedite and conduct centralized
assembly of files, an initial screening by a "paraprofessional," and a series of expedited internal
deadlines. Id. at 313-17.
3.17. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
Cm. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
318. Id.
319. See Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 61, at 65, 69; see also Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus
as a Safety Valvefor Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415,430 (1990-1991).
320. Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 61, at 69.
321. Congress has not formalized innocence-based review, though it has also not enacted proposed
habeas legislation which far from creating an innocence "fast track," would make assertion of
innocence prohibitively difficult. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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aggregation and remedies along the lines of the approaches discussed in
Part II. Patterns of error that would otherwise go untreated, as in the Tenth
Circuit, could instead be referred to an innocence special master, who
would arrange for consolidated counsel. Similar to the Louisiana court, the
court could bifurcate and target issues, and not resolve difficult individual
questions of harmless error and disposition of claims. Courts or petitioners
could then assemble issues-only proceedings to remedy particular
problems, such as prosecutorial misconduct, faulty eyewitness
identification procedures, pattern of shoddy forensic evidence, and
Brady violations.322 They could also simply group cases raising common
problems before specialized decision makers.
Such new centers for appellate review could then continually collect
data on the causes of wrongful convictions that they identify.323 Rather than
rubber stamp habeas corpus petitions as likely frivolous, judges could use
aggregation to focus on substantive issues. State courts might be better able
to do this, since they are not constrained by the AEDPA; proposals in
Illinois and Massachusetts, for example, permit greater substantive review
in capital cases.324 Consolidating appeals might allow courts to identify
patterns of error and to more efficiently correct and educate deviating
lower courts.325 Appellate courts could also assess patterns of error within
prosecutor's offices or police departments.
Such review furthers the underlying purposes of habeas corpus, which
the Supreme Court states is "at its core, an equitable remedy" in which
courts may make exceptions to procedural rules in "extraordinary cases"
for "truly deserving" petitioners who would otherwise face a "miscarriage
of justice" based on actual innocence.326 Yet courts can not easily assess
322. Data from state courts and innocence commissions could be shared with a judge or special
master, who could then develop expertise in technical and scientific issues involved in assessing
innocence; for example, understanding forensic evidence, eyewitness identification issues, and coerced
confessions. Such data could lead eventually to a change in the procedures by which courts handle
petitions and a move toward a second tier of substantive review for cases raising indicia of innocence.
323. Courts could "[r]equire the official collection and reporting of data on cases where newly
discovered evidence of innocence is the basis for overturning a conviction." See JIM DWYER, PETER
NEUFELD, BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 290 (2000).
324. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Protecting The Innocent: The Massachusetts Governor's Council
Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 563-72 (2005); Stephen L. Richards, Reasonable Doubt
Redux: The Return of Substantive Criminal Appellate Review in Illinois, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495
(2001).
325. Courts could identify geographic patterns; error rates vary greatly among counties within
states. For example, James Liebman's landmark study of capital sentencing uncovered that higher
proportions of reversals came from counties with the highest percentage of capital sentencing. See
James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences In
The United States, J.E.L.S. 209-261 (2004), http://www.stat.columbia.edu/-gelman/phd.students/
death.pdf.
326. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995) (citing cases); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. 345, 350 (1973) ("'The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative
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whether there has been a "miscarriage," and remain divided on how to
interpret the burden for showing "actual innocence" either as a "gateway"
to excuse a procedural default or as a freestanding claim.327
One way to develop what such a burden would entail would be to
create a setting in which district courts could gather information and
compare "actual innocence" claims. A common law of innocence could
emerge.3 28 A concern then arises as to appellants who are unable to obtain
relief in trial courts and relegated to second tier justice in appellate courts.
Courts might neglect procedural rights asserted by those who lack DNA
evidence or other means to make a colorable claim of innocence in a
system more focused on special cases of the innocent and neglecting
criminal procedure rights presented in many other cases.129 Given the rise
of aggregation through class actions, multi-district litigation, and
consolidation, Judith Resnik suggests that "federal courts have become less
willing to attend to small cases and to individual problems."33 The same
could occur as to criminal procedure rights. As noted, courts have already
sounded alarms in response to unpublished summary dismissals by judges
seeking to clear dockets.33' The quality of decision making could suffer
under an aggregate regime, prejudicing appellants if they lack an exit right
or counsel.332
Then again, federal judges already summarily or sua sponte dismiss
almost all habeas petitions.333 The Court has long stated that one purpose of
and flexibility essential to ensure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected."'); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294, 299 (1969) (courts may fashion "appropriate
mode[s] of procedure" to efficiently resolve habeas proceedings).
327. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (majority of the Court holding that a
"persuasive" demonstration of actual innocence would render unconstitutional a capital conviction);
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 312 (stating that a showing of "innocence" to excuse default requires a petitioner to
show "more likely than not that 'no reasonable juror' would have convicted him"); see also Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, House v. Bell, 2005 WL 1527632 *17-28 (2005) (citing circuit splits regarding the
Schlup test, regarding to what degree new evidence must undermine the old, application of the
"reasonable juror" standard, and whether a showing of actual innocence is required).
328. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 111-14 (describing how
civil wrongful conviction suits could similarly redefine content of criminal procedure rights given a
refined understanding of causes of error).
329. If few cases raise indicia of innocence, that would be noteworthy, and would mean scant
judicial resources would be drawn from second tier cases.
330. Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2220 (1989).
331. See generally 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2573, at 487-88 (1995) ("many courts of appeals have held that the district courts [in
ruling on habeas petitions] must either make findings or otherwise give their reasons for their action").
332. As in civil class actions, courts may generalize law to reach common issues but in doing so
defeat individual rights. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 n. 73 (1998).
333. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 17 (1995),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf (finding 63% of petitions were denied summarily);
see also Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foil § 2254. Judges may already in
practice assume most criminal appeals are frivolous, but examine claims raising indicia of innocence.
See Anna-Rose Mathieson & Samuel R. Gross, Review for Error, 2 LAW, PROB. & RISK 259, 265
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habeas corpus is to provide "procedures designed to discourage baseless
claims and to keep the system open for valid ones. ' 34 Current habeas law
does not effectively perform this sifting function. As Justice Jackson
admonished, "[it must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to
be buried in a flood of worthless ones." '335 Judge Friendly added that while
Justice Jackson's "thought may be distasteful [] no judge can honestly deny
it is real." '336 Focusing on relief only for the "colorably innocent" perhaps is
less controversial now that the innocent have their convictions upheld,
while violations of criminal procedural rights are declared harmless,
defaulted or unexhausted. 37 The Court and then the AEDPA have already
shifted federal habeas corpus toward abbreviated review of error. 338
Explicitly adopting a two-tier system of review could merely make the
current reality transparent and permit more careful review of the cases with
greater merit. Therefore, an intermediate approach that is able to identify
patterns of error might then encourage courts to adopt procedural
aggregation to remedy systemic problems detected.
C. Aggregation, Institutional Reform,
and Criminal Procedure Rights
If courts continue to examine systemic problems and remedy them by
aggregating criminal cases and appeals, they may assume a Chayesian
institutional reform or structural reform role, but by aggregating cases
themselves from within the criminal system.339 Just as civil class actions
arose as "an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries not remedied
by the regulatory action of the government," perhaps courts will use
aggregation as a form of judicial self-help, to directly enjoin institutions
responsible for harms that only arise piecemeal in our current system.34°
In that sense, the aggregation I have described in criminal law sheds
light back on civil aggregation and its unique problems. Aggregation in
criminal law does not involve economic recoveries, and therefore avoids
the dangers of self-interested attorneys. Unlike in civil class actions (except
(2003) ("in ordinary criminal cases appellate courts might tacitly assume that most defendants are
guilty, focus their attention primarily on the rare cases in which they think a defendant might be
innocent, and paper over procedural errors in the rest.").
334. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991).
335. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
336. Friendly, supra note 317, at 149.
337. Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at Parts I1-I1I.
338. Federal legislation proposed in 2005 would if enacted have made habeas corpus even more
summary and "streamlined." Proposed federal legislation to "streamline" habeas corpus would make
the process even more summary. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong.
(2005).
339. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1316 (1976).
340. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
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23(b)(2) actions), criminal courts focus on injunctive institutional reform.
Aggregation in criminal law is driven not by private actors, but is centered
in courts, themselves seeking to detect, monitor, and remedy, in which they
play a central role.
Court centered aggregation may also provide a more effective
institutional reform remedy for police abuses, inadequate counsel, and
prosecutorial misconduct than civil rights litigation did even in its
heyday. 3 While civil rights litigation brought ancillary to criminal
litigation once commonly sought to remedy patterns and practices of police
abuse or prosecutorial misconduct, as noted, such civil actions now face
substantial doctrinal roadblocks and rarely result in direct relief.342 For
example, a civil rights lawsuit seeking to structurally reform a state crime
laboratory would likely run aground on doctrines of standing, comity,
and deference to state law enforcement. 343 However, the West Virginia
Supreme Court was able to institute top to bottom reform of its state crime
laboratory. These aggregative experiments show that courts can order
procedural reforms to prevent miscarriages from happening in the first
place, rather than simply respond to error after the fact.
This type of aggregation also calls into question our current
constitutional criminal procedure. Appellate review is severely constricted
where the Supreme Court conceives of constitutional remedies for criminal
procedure violations as individual, permitting relief only if the violation
was a harmful error that sufficiently prejudiced the outcome at trial. 344
While criminal procedure rights ostensibly serve deterrence goals
of criminal procedure, 345 decades of harmless error jurisprudence and
procedural bars mean that courts rarely grant the reversals that might
341. On the decline of the Chayesian public law ideal and possibilities for its revitalization, see
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
342. Regarding failure of civil class action suits regarding inadequate indigent defense, see
Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of
Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); see also Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A
Review Of Recent Efforts To Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted And Later
Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004); Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 87.
(describing a litany of obstacles faced by class actions seeking relief against discriminatory law
enforcement). However, I have described elsewhere possible transformative effects of individual civil
wrongful conviction suits seeking damages (and sometimes resulting in injunctive settlements). See
Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19. For accounts of how public law litigation
accomplishes successes outside the traditional litigation model, see Sabel & Simon, supra note 341;
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra.
343. See Garrett, Standing While Black, supra note 89. For a federal court dismissing as non-
justiciable a civil challenge to inadequate indigent representation, see supra note 194.
344. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 99-100.
345. The Supreme Court ruled that trial courts must exclude evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional rights not as a "personal constitutional right," but rather to protect the public by deterring
official misconduct. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1976).
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affect law enforcement and prosecutors in practice.116 A striking example
discussed above was the forensic fraud by Joyce Gilchrist, who was found
by several Oklahoma criminal courts to have engaged in misconduct. But
the courts did nothing more to impose discipline or audits because in each
individual case the misconduct was ruled harmless error. It was not until
years later, after fraud in hundreds of cases surfaced and at the urging of
the Governor, that the system finally confronted what had by then become
a mass harm.347 Thus, if courts acknowledge that criminal procedure rights
can reveal systemic issues, they can bolster the deterrent power of
constitutional criminal procedure rights.
With the deterrent effect of both criminal appeals and civil rights
litigation undermined, aggregation in criminal law necessitates a turn
toward protecting substantive rights of defendants. Taking Louisiana's
treatment of ineffective assistance of counsel as an example, the provision
of inadequate counsel concerns not just one convict's rights, but implicates
the indigent defense funding system of the municipality. Yet appellate
courts typically take cases as they see them, on an individual basis and ask
whether the performance of counsel in one case was prejudicial at trial. In
such instances courts rarely grant relief, and thus fail to reach policy or
baseline funding issues.3 48 By separating out and aggregating the group
problem of ineffective assistance, courts can examine a systemic problem
affecting all indigent defendants. This would allow courts to refrain from
focusing on individual questions of prejudice that typically render claims
prohibitively difficult to prevail upon in practice.
Moving beyond such aggregative models, the intermediate
institutional reform models that I discuss-including innocence
commissions, prosecutorial review, use of special masters, and two-track
review-may also restructure the criminal system to better detect, remedy,
and prevent errors. In addition to criminal courts, powerful repeat players
such as prosecutor's offices or law enforcement can ensure compliance
with constitutional norms. Nevertheless, such self-regulation may not
always be reliable, and when persistent patterns of constitutional error arise
as in the past, courts can both enforce remedies for violations and deter
future violations.
Finally, courts and other actors could apply aggregation to not only
the problems remedied by the courts in the five case studies discussed, but
to the full range of criminal procedure rights that defendants may assert,
such as chronic under-funding of indigent defense, repeat prosecutorial
misconduct, malfeasance in forensic laboratories, or patterns of concealing
346. See Garrett, Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, supra note 19, at 99-100.
347. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
348. For criticism of the failure of courts to "enforce minimum levels of funding for public
defenders' offices," see Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 62, at 70.
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exculpatory evidence. When viewed in the aggregate each set of problems
may resemble mass torts or mass injuries to criminal defendants. A mass
remedy is only appropriate. Criminal justice institutions have rarely asked
or answered such systemic questions, but if they do, they can redefine the
substance of our constitutional criminal procedure.
CONCLUSION
The divide erected by the Supreme Court between civil and criminal
law leaves substantial leeway for courts to aggregate in criminal cases. The
Court focused its due process rights and rules on the criminal trial. As a
result, while courts may not aggregate in regards to elements of a crime
that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, aggregation
regarding affirmative criminal procedure rights of defendants remains
viable and highly desirable. Constrained by formalism, the criminal system
may fail to adequately remedy grave miscarriages such as wrongful
convictions, or endemic problems like inadequate representation or official
misconduct.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on a formal individualized day in
court has ironically pushed lower courts to adopt aggregation as judicial
self-help. Lower courts now aggregate as a creative and pragmatic
alternative to a thicket of procedure that consumes vast resources that
could be better spent addressing pressing problems of substance. If the
issue reaches the Supreme Court, it should embrace, not undermine, this
previously unexplored grassroots expansion of the boundaries of criminal
adjudication.
While the contours of aggregation in criminal law remain untested and
unexplored, I propose a roadmap to guide courts in this foreign terrain. My
functional due process approach requires attention to due process
safeguards regarding preclusion, exit, and adequate representation. This
framework both structures aggregation in criminal law and erects
protections against the dangers of mass criminal justice. After all,
aggregation remains double-edged. Courts must vigilantly review these
innovative mechanisms to ensure against en masse sacrifice of criminal
procedure rights of the accused and magnification of already endemic
inadequate indigent representation. Nevertheless, the five case studies
presented indicate how aggregation regarding specific criminal procedure
rights permits remedies for systemic problems that can only benefit
criminal defendants and appellants.
Finally, I suggest that a second wave of innovation could restructure
the criminal system by adopting intermediate forms of aggregation by
courts and other criminal justice actors. Such institutional reform
innovations include innocence commissions, prosecutorial review, special
masters, and "two-tier" review of cases raising indicia of innocence. Such
2007]
CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW
institutional approaches create opportunities for actors at all levels to
address systemic problems rather than examining criminal convictions
individually, while also avoiding the procedural risks of aggregation.
Intermediate models may reinvigorate substantive institutional reform and
substantive solutions in our currently overly-proceduralized and
individualized criminal system. At the same time, when informal self-
regulation by criminal justice actors does not sufficiently prevent recurring
constitutional violations, as may often occur depending on how effective
such programs are, court-centered aggregation may still provide a crucial
remedy and a deterrent to enforce compliance.
Judge Gerard E. Lynch writes that "[n]ovel legal and bureaucratic
structures typically appear when older ones fail." '349 Aggregation could
transform criminal adjudication by permitting litigation of the criminal
procedure rights of groups of people. Courts have quite understandably
been hesitant to adopt such novel procedures, except occasionally after
egregious systemic failures. That reluctance may be due to an
individualized concept of criminal procedure, a lack of a perceived need, or
an unwillingness to interject courts into difficult and intrusive long-term
projects addressing systemic issues. Shedding light on the promise of
aggregation allows a reconsideration of our individualized adjudication of
criminal procedure rights. The five case studies illustrate how courts can
appropriately use aggregative techniques to effectively address a range of
pervasive criminal procedure problems. Aggregation provides courts with
more efficient means to uncover and remedy systemic violations of
constitutional rights, craft structural reforms for institutions, secure higher
quality legal representation and expert assistance, and achieve greater
equality. If courts further embrace its potential, aggregation promises
significant improvement in the efficiency, accuracy, fairness and integrity
of our criminal justice system.
349. Lynch, supra note 72, at 2142.
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